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Preface
This volume contains revised versions of the papers selected for the first volume of the Online
Handbook of Argumentation for AI (OHAAI). Previously, formal theories of argument and argu-
ment interaction have been proposed and studied, and this has led to the more recent study of
computational models of argument. Argumentation, as a field within artificial intelligence (AI), is
highly relevant for researchers interested in symbolic representations of knowledge and defeasible
reasoning. The purpose of this handbook is to provide an open access and curated anthology for
the argumentation research community. OHAAI is designed to serve as a research hub to keep track
of the latest and upcoming PhD-driven research on the theory and application of argumentation in
all areas related to AI. The handbook’s goals are to:
1. Encourage collaboration and knowledge discovery between members of the argumentation
community.
2. Provide a platform for PhD students to have their work published in a citable peer-reviewed
venue.
3. Present an indication of the scope and quality of PhD research involving argumentation for
AI.
The papers in this volume are those selected for inclusion in OHAAI Vol.1 following a back-and-
forth peer-review process undertaken by the editors of OHAAI Vol.1. The volume thus presents a
strong representation of the current state of the art research of argumentation in AI that has been
strictly undertaken during PhD studies. Papers in this volume are listed alphabetically by author.
We hope that you will enjoy reading this handbook.
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Argument Games for Dialectical Classical Logic Argumentation
Federico Castagna
Department of Informatics, King’s College London, UK
Abstract
Argument games proof theories allow
computing the membership of an argument
to a specific extension according to the
semantics the proof theory is meant to capture.
These games assume the form of a dialectical
exchange of arguments between two players
which, alternating in turns, try to attack each
other counterpart’s arguments. Dialectical
Classical logic Argumentation (Dialectical
Cl-Arg) is a novel approach that provides
real-world dialectical characterisations of
Cl-Arg arguments by resource-bounded
agents while preserving the rational criteria
established by the rationality postulates. This
paper combines both subjects and introduces
argument games for Dialectical Cl-Arg,
highlighting the properties and strengths
enjoyed by these games in comparison with the
standard ones. The resulting proof theory will
better approximate real-world non-monotonic
single-agent reasoning processes, bridging in
this way the gap existing between formal and
informal reasoning.
1 Introduction
Human reasoning evolved to produce and evaluate
arguments ([Mercier and Sperber, 2011]). Trying to
consolidate possessed information by formulating
reasons (arguments) that challenge or defend
the information itself, is an everyday procedure
in which humans engage. This process is not
only common but even necessary: how could be
possible, otherwise, to decide what to believe or
trust without being misled by a non-reliable source
of information? This ‘scaffolding’ (as defined in
[Modgil, 2017]) role of dialogue and arguments can
also be seen in lone thinking practices since the
reasoner will evaluate the possessed information
by constructing counter-arguments against it and
by assessing its reliability. That is to say, every
reasoning process entails dialogue (even if it is
just an imaginary dialogue that a person makes
‘within himself/herself’) and every dialogue entails
arguments. The outlined reasoning process can be
adapted for any type of agent-to-agent interaction:
humans and artificial intelligences (henceforth AIs),
among themselves and with humans. Thanks to its
important role, argumentation has been developed
as a theory able to characterize the essence of
non-monotonic reasoning through the dialectical
interplay of arguments [Dung, 1995]. Intuitively, in
order to determine if a piece of information is reliable,
it will suffice to show that the argument (in which
the specific information is embedded) is justified
under one of Dung’s semantics. A way of doing this
is to show the membership of the argument to a
winning strategy of an argument game as described,
for examples, in [Modgil and Caminada, 2009],
[Vreeswik and Prakken, 2000] and
[Caminada and Wu, 2009].
Although a plethora of works has successfully
shown instantiations of Dung’s abstract
argumentation framework (AF) and reached
different goals, none of these approaches managed
to closely approximate the spontaneity of an
everyday real-world interplay of arguments.
With the introduction of the rationality
postulates ([Caminada and Amgoud, 2007] and
2
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[Caminada et al., 2012]), some steps have been
moved in this direction by, for example, avoiding
the arising of counterintuitive results in AF
instantiations. However, this is still not enough. If
we want to bridge the gap existing between formal
and informal reasoning, we need to properly account
for real-world uses of arguments by resource-bounded
agents.
Stemming from a novel approach that
provides real-world dialectical characterisations
of AF by resource-bounded agents while
preserving the rationality postulates
([D’Agostino and Modgil, 2018]), this paper will
give a short description of its proof theory. The
resulting dialectical argument game (fully-fledged
developed as part of my PhD research) will better
approximate a real-world non-monotonic single-agent
reasoning process. That is to say, the inner process
that an agent will go through in order to justify a
piece of information it posses.
2 Method
This research made use of (a) the proof-theoretical
method presented in [Modgil and Caminada, 2009]
in order to develop an argument game for (b)
Dialectical Cl-Arg [D’Agostino and Modgil, 2018].
(a) This method describes the general structure, the
legal moves allowed and the winning conditions
of a standard argument game. The precise
protocol depends on the semantics which the
proof theory is meant to capture. In a nutshell,
an argument game is played by two players:
a proponent (PRO) and its opponent (OPP).
The proponent starts by moving an argument
that it wants to test, after which each player
must attack the other player’s arguments with
a counter-argument of sufficient strength. PRO
wins the game if it is able to successfully defend
against any counter-arguments moved by OPP.
It loses otherwise.
(b) Dialectical Cl-Arg builds a formalization, for
classical logic argumentation1, that considers
1Detailed descriptions of Classical Logic Argumentation
real-world dialectical exchange of arguments by
resource-bounded agents. This entails:
• A new internal structure of the arguments
is employed.
• Due to the limited availability of resources
to real-world agents, only a finite subset of
all the arguments of the AF will be taken
into account (namely, pdAF ), while still
preserving satisfaction of the rationality
postulates;
• The subset minimality and the consistency
check on premises, required by Cl-Arg,
are computationally unfeasible for
resource-bounded agents. This is why
the properties of Dialectical Cl-Arg allow
to avoid them, while still preserving
satisfaction of the rationality postulates.
3 Discussion
Argument games for Dialectical Cl-Arg are
represented as trees branching downwards (called
dialectical dispute trees). The roots of these trees
correspond to the argument X that the proponent
wants to test. If PRO is capable of defending
X against any defeats2 moved by the opponent’s
arguments and OPP runs out of legal moves
according to the protocol of the specific game
played (this depends on which Dung’s semantics
is considered), then PRO wins the game. The
victory of the proponent implies that the piece of
information embedded in X is reliable and justified
according to the semantics the game was meant to
capture.
To develop this proof theory, we had to adapt
the work of [Modgil and Caminada, 2009] keeping in
mind all the unique features of Dialectical Cl-Arg.
The most problematic of which is certainly the
different structure of the arguments, since it includes
can be found in [Besnard and Hunter, 2008] and
[Gorogiannis and Hunter, 2011].
2Notice that the considered argumentation framework is
based on the defeat relation among arguments rather than the
attack relation.
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suppositions. To clarify, assume that X = (∆,Γ, α) is
a Dialectical Cl-Arg argument, while X ′ = (∆, α) is
a Cl-Arg argument. ∆ and α are called, respectively,
premises and conclusion, while Γ represents the
suppositions. In real-world dialectical interactions,
it is a common practice to suppose the premises
of the opponent’s arguments (without committing
to them3), in order to show inconsistencies or draw
new conclusions. As an example, let us consider the
following fictitious exchange of arguments happening
between a prosecutor (which assumes the role of
PRO) and a suspect in a courthouse, namely Mr
Corleone (which assumes the role of OPP):
PROSEC “We have noticed the transfer of
about 20 million dollars to your bank account on
the incriminated day. Mr Corleone, we strongly
suspect you have not licitly earned that money.”
MR-COR “Aunt Mary passed away about a
month ago. She was a very wealthy and generous
woman. The money I received was just the
inheritance I was legally entitled to.”
PROSEC “Ok. Let’s suppose, as you are
saying, that your old aunt passed away a month
ago. According to the documents we retrieved,
we know that Mary Corleone died three years
ago. This seems to contradict your story.”
MR-COR “I am talking about a different
relative: Mary Rossi and not Mary Corleone.”
PROSEC “Very well. Let’s then suppose
that Mary Rossi is the relative from whom you
received the money. However, no official record
seems to certify the existence of this woman.
This thwarts your story once again.”
The prosecutor supposes the premises of the suspect’s
arguments (hence, accepts the premises without
committing to them) in order to derive conclusions
that defeat the arguments moved by Mr Corleone,
undermining the credibility of his defence.
In general, when challenging the acceptability of
an argument with respect to an admissible set S,
3This allows avoiding the so-called “Foreign commitment
problem” [Caminada et al., 2014].
the defeating argument can suppose premises from
all the arguments in S. Whereas, the argument
that defends S can only suppose the premises of
the defeating argument. Accommodating this in a
dialectical dispute tree means that, when testing the
acceptability of the arguments that PRO has moved
in the winning strategy (i.e., the set S), OPP can
suppose the premises of these arguments in order to
draw conclusions. PRO, in turn, can only suppose
the premises of the argument that OPP is playing
for invalidating the winning strategy. Although
adding suppositions and the reference to a set S
complicates the formalisms of the argument games,
it also enables additional dialectical moves to the
players, better approximating a real-world reasoning
process. An instance of the newly introduced proof
theory can be seen in Figure 1. Starting with the
Figure 1: An example of a dialectical dispute tree
root A1, which is the argument that PRO wants to
test, the two players alternate in moving arguments
extending the dialectical dispute tree following the
order highlighted by the numbers near the labels
P and O (meaning, respectively, PRO and OPP).
Argument H2, played by OPP, supposes the premise
a (circled in Figure 1) of either A1 orG1, since both of
them are in S. This supposition allows H2 to derive a
conclusion, which defeats a premise of G1
4. However,
4Notice that the only allowed defeat is the undermine defeat
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the proponent succeeded in defending the root A1
against each of the opponent’s defeat. Assuming
OPP has no more legal moves to play, PRO has a
winning strategy and wins the game. This implies
that A1 is an argument justified according to the
semantics of the played game, i.e., the information
embedded by A1 is reliable according to the semantics
the game was meant to capture.
Dialectical dispute tree properties
In the following, we are going to list the main features
enjoyed by any dialectical dispute tree in comparison
with the standard (non-dialectical) dispute trees. We
will not consider most of the properties inherited from
Dialectical Cl-Arg since they are not useful for this
purpose:
Set S The arguments moved by the proponent
in the winning strategy correspond to the
admissible set S, which includes and defends the
root of the tree. That is to say, the information
that PRO wants to test is defended and made
reliable by the arguments in S.
Relevance The players alternate to move
arguments that change the outcome of the game
at every turn, avoiding any unnecessary detour
to this task.
Minimality of the winning strategy Real-world
agents do not waste their limited amount of
resources. PRO moves only the minimal number
of arguments needed for generating a winning
strategy.
No conflicting PRO arguments The detection
of conflicting arguments in S happens via
dialectical means. This prevents PRO from
building a winning strategy which is not
conflict-free.
(i.e., the defeat that targets the premises of an argument)
[D’Agostino and Modgil, 2018]. Also, for simplicity, we are
omitting the preference relation existing among the arguments
of the dialectical dispute tree.
No self-defeating arguments No rational
real-world agent would state an argument that
defeats itself. This move would be useless for the
proceeding of the game and, as such, it would be
a misuse of resources.
The above properties outline a dispute tree composed
by moves more aligned with the real-world uses of
arguments for resource-bounded agents.
4 Conclusion
The main features of the real-world uses of
argumentation by resource-bounded agents include:
(a) showing arguments inconsistencies by supposing
the opponent’s premises; (b) handling only finite
subsets of the arguments of the AFs; (c)
optimizing resources consumption by employing
dialectical means (while still satisfying the rationality
postulates). These attributes constitute the main
components of the introduced argument game
proof theory, thus capable of better approximate
non-monotonic single-agent reasoning processes.
Unfortunately, the limited space prevented us to
fully appreciate the extent of the formalism which
would have also included specific protocols for Dung’s
grounded and preferred semantics.
The overall aim of my PhD is to investigate and
develop proof theories for Dialectical Cl-Arg. As
such, a natural extension of the research presented
in this paper will be the generation of algorithms
for computing argument extensions through an
adaptation of the method of labelling described
in [Modgil and Caminada, 2009]. The labelling
approach has the advantage of easily bringing the
dialectical reasoning of the argument games to
an algorithmic level. This work will then be
further expanded to include argument games and
labellings for the stable ([Caminada and Wu, 2009]),
semi-stable ([Caminada, 2007]) and ideal semantics
([Dung et al., 2007] [Caminada, 2011]). If time
permits, another research path that will be pursued
will involve the generalisation of the developed
dialectical argument games to dialogues by following
the guidelines of the already existing literature in
5
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the field (mainly [Prakken, 2005]). This would have
the interesting consequence of allowing to move from
non-monotonic single-agent inference to distributed
non-monotonic reasoning.
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Economic Rationality and Abstract Argumentation
Timotheus Kampik
Ume˚a University, Sweden
Abstract
This article presents a line of work that
builds a bridge between abstract argumentation
as a method of non-monotonic reasoning
and formal models of economically rational
decision-making. As the foundation of
this bridge, we introduce the reference
independence principle, which is a key
property of economic rationality, to abstract
argumentation. We relate this principle to
principles of non-monotonic reasoning and,
from this starting point, outline a set of
research directions we are pursuing to better
integrate abstract argumentation and models of
economic rationality.
1 Introduction
In the symbolic artificial intelligence community,
formal argumentation has emerged as a popular
approach to instill reasoning capabilities
into intelligent systems. A foundational
method of formal argumentation is abstract
argumentation [Dung, 1995]. An abstract
argumentation framework is a tuple of atomic
arguments and binary relations (attacks) between
these arguments. For example, when we construct
the argument framework AF = ({a, b}, {(a, b)}),
we have the arguments a and b, and argument b
is attacked by argument a. Arguments can be, for
example, epistemic (let a denote the fact that it
rains) or utilitarian (let b denote the action of leaving
the house without an umbrella). To determine
which set(s) of arguments in an argumentation
framework can be considered “feasible” conclusions,
argumentation semantics have been defined. While
it is clear that the set of conclusions that results from
the argumentation frameworkAF is {a}, determining
conclusions is not trivial for cyclic argumentation
frameworks. For example, in the argumentation
framework AF ′ = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}),
either no arguments ({}), or any of the sets {a},
{b}, or {c} can be considered conclusions (depending
on the semantics). Consequently, an argumentation
semantics can return several argument sets that
can be potentially be considered acceptable for a
given framework. In this article we use preferred
semantics as defined in the initial paper on
abstract argumentation [Dung, 1995]. Given an
argumentation framework AF = (AR,AT ), let us
first define a conflict-free set of arguments as a set
S ⊆ AR that do not attack each other. Also, a set
S ⊆ AR is admissible iff it is conflict-free and its
arguments attack all arguments in AR that attack
S. A set S ⊆ AR is a preferred extension of AF iff
it is maximal with regards to set inclusion among
all admissible sets in AF . Preferred semantics
determines the preferred extensions of AF . Let us
denote all preferred extensions of AF by σpref (AF ).
Given the two example frameworks above, we have
σpref (AF ) = {{a}} and σpref (AF ′) = {{}}.
Many different argumentation semantics exist,
and it is often not clear which semantics is the
most feasible one for a specific application scenario.
Consequently, an important line of research on
abstract argumentation is the identification of
argumentation principles–formal properties of
argumentation semantics–and the evaluation
of argumentation semantics w.r.t. to these
7
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principles [van der Torre and Vesic, 2017]. In
our line of research, we add a new perspective to the
principle-based evaluation by introducing a principle
that is based on microeconomic decision-theory. In
particular, we introduce the reference independence
principle, which serves as the point of departure
for more research at the intersection of abstract
argumentation and formal models of economic
rationality. We derive this principle from the
property of the same name that is a cornerstone
of the rational man paradigm in microeconomic
theory. When choosing items from a set S, a
rational-decision maker’s choice A∗ ⊆ S implies that
the decision-maker prefers A∗ over all other sets in
2S . When choosing from another set that potentially
intersects with S, the implied preferences must be
consistent.
Example 1. For instance, when we have a consumer
who can choose to consume from a set containing tea
and juice ({t, j}), her choice of juice ({j}) implies
{j} is preferred over all other sets in 2{t,j}. Let
us assume that on another occasion, a third item–a
donut–is present in the set, all other things being the
same as before. Our consumer chooses tea and a
donut ({t, d} from {t, j, d}). The choice implies that
{t, d} is preferred over all other sets in 2{t,j,d}, which
is consistent with the previous choice. However, were
she to choose juice ({j} from {t, j, d}), the preference
{j} over {t} would be inconsistent with the previously
established preference {t} over {j}.
Note that in our interpretation of the rational
man model, the set of choice items does not
necessarily need to refer to physical goods, but can
also model courses of action, or beliefs that can
be adopted or discarded. Our ambition to better
integrate abstract argumentation and formal models
of economic decision-making can be considered a
natural continuation of work presented in the initial
paper on abstract argumentation, which applies
argumentation to the stable marriage problem of
cooperative game theory [Dung, 1995].
Let us introduce and motivate the concept of
reference independence in abstract argumentation
with the help of a simple example.
Example 2. Let us assume the role of a strategy
advisor (human or IT system) in a large corporation.
We propose the launch of new products to a
decision-maker who has the final say. At the moment,
we are considering the launch of the products a′ or
b′. a′ and b′ are similar; however, studies show
that a′ is expected to outperform b′. We model this
assessment as an argumentation framework AF =
(AR,Attacks), such that:
AF = ({a, b}, {(a, b)}),
where a means “launch a′” and b means “launch
b′”. Let us assume we resolve AF using
preferred semantics σpref , i.e., σpref (AF ) = {{a}}.
Consequently, we tell the decision-maker that she can
launch a′.
Now, let us assume the decision-maker postpones
her decision and asks us to come back some time
later with an updated analysis. In the meantime, a
new product–c′–is prototyped and evaluated in terms
of market fit by our R&D department. According to
the evaluation, the target consumer group typically
prefers buying c′ over a′, while they typically prefer
b′ over c′:
AF ′ = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)})
We again use preferred semantics, i.e., σpref (AF
′) =
{{}}. However, it is clear that the decision-maker
will question our sanity if we recommend her to
launch no product now that more potential options
are on the table1. Indeed, the adjustment of
our decision outcome from “a′” to “nothing” ({})
is inconsistent with the reference independence
principle in microeconomic theory: the addition of
the irrelevant alternatives 2AR
′\2AR of argument sets
we can potentially consider as acceptable makes us
switch from accepting {a} ({a} is preferred over {})
to accepting {} ({} is preferred over {a}). Figure 1
depicts the example’s argumentation frameworks.
In this line of research we aim to address the
problem the example highlights.
1A better recommendation would be to delay the decision
until more intelligence is gathered. Still, it makes sense to be
able to make a somewhat reasonable decision at any point.
8
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a
b
(a) AF .
a
b
c
(b) AF ′.
Figure 1: Reference dependence: σpref (AF ) = {{a}}
and σpref (AF
′) = {{}}. The addition of the not
acceptable argument cmakes us discard the extension
{a} in favor of {}.
2 Reference Independence and
Cautious Monotony
The motivation of the reference independence
principle is to assess whether a decision-making
outcome can be considered “reasonable”. In the
domain of non-monotonic reasoning, the cautious
monotony [Gabbay, 1985, Schro¨der et al., 2010] and
rational monotony [Benferhat et al., 1997] principles
have been defined with a similar objective, but
without making the connection to economic
decision theory. In our work, we introduce
these principles to abstract argumentation.
We define strong and weak restricted and
rational monotony properties, similarly to the
way Cˇyras and Toni have defined cautious
monotony in the context of assumption-based
argumentation [Cˇyras and Toni, 2015]. Let us have
an argumentation semantics σ, two argumentation
frameworks AF = (AR,AT ) and AF ′ = (AR′, AT ′),
and their extensions σ(AF ) and σ(AF ′). We can
colloquially describe cautious and rational monotony
as follows:
• For each extension E in σ(AF ), we “adjust” AF ′
and get an AF ′′ in which all “new” attacks (that
are in AF ′, but not in AF ) to E are removed.
σ is strongly cautiously monotonous iff all
extensions E′′ ∈ σ(AF ′′) contain E. σ isweakly
cautiously monotonous iff there exists an
extension E′′ ∈ σ(AF ′′) that contains E.
• For each extension E in σ(AF ), we “adjust” AF ′
and get an AF ′′′ in which all “new” attacks to
E, as well as from E, are removed. σ is strongly
rationally monotonous iff all extensions E′′′ ∈
σ(AF ′′′) contain E. σ is weakly rationally
monotonous iff there exists an extension E′′′ ∈
σ(AF ′′′) that contains E.
Analogously, we can describe reference independence
as follows. Again, we have an argumentation
semantics σ, two argumentation frameworks AF =
(AR,AT ) and AF ′ = (AR′, AT ′), and their
extensions σ(AF ) and σ(AF ′):
• Strong reference independence. For each
extension E in σ(AF ), the preferences over
the argument sets in 2AR∩AR
′
implied by all
extensions in σ(AF ′) are consistent with the
preferences implied by E.
• Weak reference independence. For each
extension E in σ(AF ), the preferences over the
argument sets in 2AR∩AR
′
implied by at least
one extension in σ(AF ′) are consistent with the
preferences implied by E.
In [Kampik and Nieves, 2020], we provide a
comprehensive formal comparison of reference
independence and other non-monotonic reasoning
properties in the context of abstract argumentation.
We also show that most (but not all) argumentation
semantics are not weakly reference independent. In
ongoing research, we work on the definition of new
semantics that are reference independent and also
fulfill other desirable principles.
3 Ensuring Reference
Independence
It is clear that strong reference independence is a
property that is unrealistic to obtain. In contrast,
weak reference independence can be considered
useful, as we can show with the help of an example, in
which we make use of concepts introduced by Gabbay
for the purpose of loop-busting [Gabbay, 2014].
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a
b
c
an
Figure 2: AF ′an. Solving the problem depicted in
Figure 1. The annihilator approach enables us to
achieve reference independence.
1. We go back to Example 2, starting with AF =
({a, b}, {(a, b)}, which we resolve using preferred
semantics as σpref (AF ) = {{a}}. Because
we have exactly one extension, we decide that
{a} is the set of acceptable arguments (i.e., we
recommend launching product a′).
2. When resolving the expanded framework
AF ′ = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}),
σpref (AF
′) returns {{}}. This implies
inconsistent preferences with regards to how we
have resolved AF (as explained in Example 1).
Hence, we create an argumentation framework
AF ′an, in which an annihilator argument is added
to AF ′, such that we have exactly one extension
E ∈ σ(AF ′an) and E \ {an} is an extension of
AF ′ that implies consistent preferences with the
extension {a} we have previously determined
for AF . For example, we can define AF ′an
as ({a, b, c, an}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a), (an, c)}) so
that σpref (AF
′
an) = {{a, an}}. Given the only
extension E = {a, an}, we have E \ {an} = {a}.
E \ {an} is our final extension of AF ′.
3. For any subsequent argumentation framework,
we can check if there is any extension that
ensures reference independence with regards to
the previous argumentation framework and, if
not, proceed as described in the steps before.
Figure 2 depicts the argumentation AF ′an. In ongoing
research, we work on defining formal approaches
to ensure reference independence, as well as other
non-monotonic reasoning principles, when resolving
sequences of argumentation frameworks for semantics
that do not fulfill these principles in general.
4 Game Theory and Abstract
Argumentation
As mentioned above, already the initial paper on
abstract argumentation relates to (cooperative)
game theory. Further research provides game
theoretical perspectives on abstract argumentation
primarily by observing properties that emerge
from the exchange of arguments between several
autonomous agents. Thereby, no assumptions
are made with regards to the agent’s rationality
in the formal economic sense. For instance,
Rahwan and Larson show, for some argumentation
semantics and depending on the properties of the
agents’ preferences, how the Pareto-optimal sets
of arguments in an argumentation framework
relate to the extensions different semantics
return [Rahwan and Larson, 2008].
Given that we have introduced the formal
foundations of instilling economically rational
behavior into abstract argumentation-based agents,
the existing works on argumentation and game
theory can be examined from a different perspective.
The results of this research direction can potentially
be applied to define agreement protocols for
autonomous agents.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have provided an intuition of how
principles of rational microeconomic decision-making
can be applied to abstract argumentation. We
have outlined a set of promising research directions
to further advance research at the intersection of
formal argumentation, non-monotonic reasoning and
economic theory. We expect that the research results
will shed new light on how abstract argumentation
can be used as a non-monotonic reasoning method.
Potentially, this line of work can enable the
introduction of formal argumentation as a model
10
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of economic decision-making to the microeconomics
community.
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A Discussion Game for the Credulous Decision Problem of
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks under Preferred Semantics
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Bernoulli Institute, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs)
have been introduced as a general formalism
for modeling and evaluating argumentation.
However, the role of discussion in reasoning in
ADFs has not been clarified well so far. The
current work presents a discussion game, as
a proof method, to answer credulous decision
problems of ADFs under preferred semantics.
The game is the basis for an algorithm that
can be used not only for answering the
decision problem but also for human-machine
interaction.
1 Introduction
Argumentation has recently received increased
attention within artificial intelligence. A wide
range of formalisms has been introduced for
modeling and evaluating argumentation. Abstract
dialectical frameworks (ADFs), introduced first
by [Brewka and Woltran, 2010], are expressive
generalizations of Dung’s widely used argumentation
frameworks (AFs) [Dung, 1995]. ADFs abstract
away from the content of arguments but are
expressive enough to model different types of
relations among arguments. A key question is ‘How
is it possible to evaluate the truth value of arguments
in a given ADF?’ Answering this question leads to
the introduction of several types of semantics, defined
based on three-valued interpretations. Moreover,
answering whether there exists an interpretation of
a particular type of semantics in which an argument
has a given value is a fundamental issue. In ADFs,
an admissible interpretation does not contain any
unjustifiable information about the arguments and
preferred semantics are prominent semantics that
present maximum information about the arguments
without losing admissibility. Further, answering
decision problems of preferred semantics has a higher
computational complexity than other semantics in
ADFs [Strass and Wallner, 2015]. Thus, answering
them has a crucial importance.
Although dialectical methods have a role in
determining semantics of both AFs and ADFs,
the roles are not obvious in the definition of
semantics. To cover this gap, quite a number
of works have been presented to show that
semantics of AFs can be interpreted in terms
of structural discussion [Prakken and Sartor, 1997,
Caminada, 2017, Dung and Thang, 2007]. Further,
the presented methods have been used in
human-machine interaction [Booth et al., 2018],
which is a wide research area in AI.
Because of the special structure of ADFs,
the existing methods used to interpret semantics
of AFs cannot be reused in ADFs. To
address this problem the first existing game
for preferred semantics of ADFs is presented
by [Keshavarzi Zafarghandi et al., 2019]. I am
working on a modification of that game to reduce
the computational complexity of the game in both
best and average cases. The previous game is defined
12
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based on only one type of move, named forward move.
To reduce the complexity, in the current game the
forward move is modified and a backward move is
also defined. Moreover, based on the current method,
an algorithm can be provided not only to answer
credulous decision problems of ADFs under preferred
semantics but also to be used in a human-machine
dialogue. Suppose that an ADF is used to formalize
a knowledge-base that presents methods to cure a
disease. It is not enough to tell a patient that a
chosen method is the best one because it is presented
in a semantics, but the patient needs to be convinced
why this is the case. The current work provides
a discussion game as a proof method to cover this
gap, for preferred semantics of ADFs. Further,
the presented method is sound and complete. In
Section 2 first I present a brief relevant background
of ADFs and then I present the idea of the game.
2 Method
An abstract dialectical framework (ADF) is a tuple
F = (A,L,C) where: 1. A is a finite set of
statements (arguments); 2. L ⊆ A × A is a set
of links among arguments; 3. C = {ϕa}a∈A is
a set of propositional formulas, called acceptance
conditions [Brewka and Woltran, 2010]. Acceptance
conditions indicate the set of links implicitly, thus,
there is no need of presenting L in ADFs explicitly.
An interpretation v (for F ) is a function v : A 7→
{t, f ,u} s.t. t, f and u refer to true, false and
undecided, respectively. Truth values can be ordered
via the information ordering relation <i given by
u <i t and u <i f . Relation ≤i is the reflexive
and transitive closure of <i. Interpretations can be
ordered via ≤i w.r.t. their information content.
Given an interpretation v, the partial valuation of
ϕa by v, is ϕ
v
a = ϕa[b/> : v(b) = t][b/⊥ : v(b) = f ],
s.t. b is a parent of a. Semantics for ADFs can be
defined via the characteristic operator ΓF . Applying
ΓF on v leads to v
′ s.t. for each a ∈ A, 1. v′(a) = t if
ϕva is irrefutable (i.e. a tautology), 2. v
′(a) = f if ϕva
is unsatisfiable, 3. otherwise, v′(a) = u.
An interpretation v is admissible if v ≤i
ΓF (v) and it is preferred if it is ≤i-maximal
admissible. It is said that a is credulously acceptable
(deniable) under σ semantics, if there exists a
σ-interpretation v for which ϕva is irrefutable (resp.
unsatisfiable). Whenever there is no ambiguity, we
write interpretations by the sequence of truth values,
by choosing the lexicographic order on arguments.
For instance, v = {a 7→ t, b 7→ u} can be represented
by tu.
In a study, quite a number of women (71.5 percent)
believed that mammography is a precise and safe
method of diagnosing cancer. However, researchers
have found that mammography has demonstrated a
number of adverse effects, two of which are breast
cancer over-diagnosis and causes of tumor rupture
and spread of cancerous cells.1 Using the ADF
formalism, this knowledge base can be modeled by
an ADF that contains three statements. Statement
m : ‘mammography is a precise and a safe method’
is acceptable if and only if mammography neither
causes o ‘over-diagnosis’ nor r ‘rupture of cancer
cells’. That is, the acceptance condition of m, namely
ϕm can be represented by propositional formula ¬o∧
¬r. Since statements of o and r are facts, proven
by recent research, they are always accepted. Thus,
the acceptance conditions of them are ϕr ≡ > and
ϕo ≡ >.
Assume that a proponent (P) believes that
mammography is a safe and precise method. To
discuss about the belief, an opponent (O) checks the
acceptance condition of m and says ‘if P’s belief is
true, then by ϕm : ¬o ∧ ¬r both o and r have to
be denied.’ Then, O challenges P: ‘Do you have
any reason why both o and r are deniable?’ In the
next step P checks the acceptance conditions of o
and r and since both of them are tautologies, neither
of them can be denied. Thus, the main belief of
P is false. This corresponds with the fact that in
this ADF, there is no preferred interpretation that
satisfies the belief of P.
A preferred discussion game is a two-player game
between proponent (P) and opponent (O), in which
P presents a claim about credulous acceptance or
denial of an argument under preferred semantics in
a given ADF. A claim of P about the truth value
of an argument can be represented by interpretation
1https://kresserinstitute.com/the-downside-of-mammograms/
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v0, called initial claim. In v0 the argument which
is claimed is assigned to t (resp. f) if it is
claimed that it is accepted (denied). Since there is
no further information about all other arguments,
they are assigned to u. The ideas of the game,
including forward and backward moves, are presented
in Example 2.1.
Example 2.1. Let F = ({a, b}, {ϕa : ¬b, ϕb :
¬a ∨ c, ϕc : ⊥}) be an ADF, depicted in Figure
1. Assume that the proponent claims that b is
credulously acceptable under preferred semantics of
F . The initial claim of P can be written by
interpretation v0 = utu.
• The game is continued by O by applying a
forward move that contains two steps. 1. O
checks the consequence of v0 on the the
acceptance condition of the argument which is
claimed by P. That is, O evaluates ϕb by v0,
which is ϕv0b : ¬a∨ c. Here v0 does not have any
role on satisfiability of ϕb. 2. O picks the truth
value of the parents of b in ϕv0b that can satisfy
the claim. For instance, O says based on the
acceptance condition of b, b can be accepted if a
is denied. That is, O presents that ‘I will agree
with you on the truth value of b in a preferred
interpretation if you can show that a 7→ f in that
interpretation’. This new piece of information
can be presented by v1 = ftu as the result of
forward move. In other words, O challenges P
by asking ‘what is your reason of this assignment
of a?’
• Since v0 <i v1, the dialogue between players can
be continued. Now it is P’s turn to investigate
whether the challenge of O is satisfiable. First,
P checks the role of v1 on ϕa. ϕ
v1
a : ⊥ presents
that a is deniable in a preferred interpretation
in which b is acceptable. Thus, the forward move
does not have the second step of finding the truth
value of parents of a in ϕv1a . Therefore, the
forward move of P leads to v2 = ftu.
• Since v1 = v2, the dialogue between the players
stops. v1 = v2 means that the information of v1
is enough to answer O’s challenge. Further, P
a b c
¬b ¬a ∨ c ⊥
Figure 1: ADF of Example 2.1
answers the challenge of O without presenting a
new claim. That is, P defends the initial claim.
Thus, the game stops here and P wins the game.
On the other hand, if in a dialogue of a game vi 6≤i
vi+1, then the dialogue between players stops and P
loses that dialogue. However, this does not mean that
P loses the game. The reason of this is that possibly
there exists another dialogue by which P can defeat
a challenge of O to defend the initial claim. In this
situation P applies a move, called backward move
to find a new dialogue. The idea of this move is
presented in the following. Consider that in ADF
F , depicted in Figure 1, O presents the following
challenge to challenge the initial claim.
• O says based on ϕb : ¬a∨c, b can be accepted if c
is acceptable. That is, O asks P ‘can you indicate
whether c 7→ t in a preferred interpretation in
which b 7→ t?’ Thus, O’s forward move is v1 =
utt.
• Since v0 <i v1 the dialogue between players
continues. First, P has to check the consequence
of the information presented by v1 on the
challenging argument, namely c. That is, P
evaluates ϕv1c : ⊥. Since ϕv1c is unsatisfiable and
c is assigned to t in move v1, P cannot decide
about the truth value of c in this move. Thus,
the forward move of P leads to v2 = utu.
• Since v1 6≤i v2, this dialogue cannot continue
anymore. That is, P loses this dialogue, but not
the game. That is, P may attempt to find a way,
a new dialogue, by which P defends the initial
claim. To this end, P applies backward move on
the current dialogue to find a new dialogue. The
idea of the backward move is as follows.
• First, P tries to find a new forward move
different from v2. This attempt is failed because
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ϕv1c is unsatisfiable and c is assigned to t in the
challenge move v1. Then, P goes one step back
and asks O to present a new challenge over the
initial claim except the one which is in v1.
• O checks the acceptance condition of b, ϕv0b : ¬a∨
c, and says that b can also be accepted if a is
denied. Thus, the forward move is v′1 = ftu.
• Since v0 <i v′1 the dialogue continues. Since v′1 is
equal with the v1 in the beginning of the example,
by presenting v2, P wins the dialogue and the
game, as well.
3 Discussion
Most argumentation frameworks are based on
abstract argumentation, which determines an
argument’s acceptability. However, the role of
discussion, which is a main feature of argumentation,
has not been clarified in most of the abstract
formalisms. As a part of my PhD, I clarify the role
of discussion on semantics of ADFs by presenting
discussion games.
The first existing game for answering the
credulous problem of ADFs has been presented
in [Keshavarzi Zafarghandi et al., 2019], my recent
publication, which focuses on preferred semantics.
I am working on the modification of that game
in which the forward move is adjusted and a
new backward move is defined to reduce the
computational complexity of the game in the best
case and in the average case. Both games answer
the credulous decision problem of ADFs under
preferred semantics. Further, both games work
locally on the truth value of arguments which are
claimed/challenged, that is, both try to find the
truth values over parents of the arguments which are
claimed/challenged.
In the new version of the game, the player
whose turn it is uses the information which is
presented by the competitor in the directly preceding
claim/challenge move v, by computing ϕva for
argument a, that is claimed/challenged in v. Then,
the player looks for the truth values of arguments in
ϕva to satisfy v(a). However, in the first version, this
step had to be done over all parents of a.
Note that since the acceptance conditions of
arguments are presented by propositional formulas,
it is possible that there exist more than one sets
of truth values over parents of a that satisfy a
claim/challenge. For instance, in Example 2.1, the
acceptance condition b, namely ϕb : ¬a ∨ c says that
b can be accepted in an interpretation if either w1 =
{a 7→ f}, w2 = {c 7→ t} or w3 = {a 7→ f , c 7→ t}. In
the current version, after picking a wi over parents
of b in ϕv0b , the player continues applying a forward
move on v0 and wi, to revise the information of v0.
However, in the previous version, O first collected
the set W =
⋃3
i=1{wi}. In general, the number of
elements of W can be blown up to 2m, where m is the
number of parents of a. Thus, the previous method
has higher best case and average case computational
complexity than the new version.
On the other hand, in the previous method, if
dialogue D = [v0, . . . , vn] faces with a contradiction,
if n is even, then P picks another element of W , for
instance w′ that P did not use before, and applies
a forward move on vn−1 and w′, and if n is odd O
does the same. In the current version to overcome the
lack of the set W , I defined a backward move which
is applied by P on D to find a new dialogue.
I am working on an algorithm based on the
game presented in Section 2. It appears that this
algorithm can also be used as tool in human-machine
interaction. As a future work, I will provide a
solver based on this method and do an experiment
to compare the performance of different solvers of
ADFs in the credulous decision problem for preferred
semantics.
4 Conclusion
In my current work, preferred discussion games
between two agents, proponent and opponent, are
considered as a proof method to investigate credulous
acceptance (denial) of arguments in an ADF under
preferred semantics. The presented methodology can
be reused in AFs and generalizations of AFs that can
be represented as subclasses of ADFs. Winning one
dialogue of the game by P is sufficient to show that
there exists a preferred interpretation in which the
initial claim is satisfied. When there is a preferred
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interpretation that satisfies the initial claim, via
the current method, in the best case and even in
the average case, there is no need to enumerate
all preferred interpretations of an ADF to answer
the credulous problem. The method is sound and
complete.
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Algorithms and Tools for Abstract Argumentation
Mickae¨l Lafages
IRIT, University of Toulouse, France
Abstract
Computing acceptability semantics of
abstract argumentation frameworks is
receiving increasing attention. Focused
on finding algorithms and tools to make the
abstract argumentation domain progress, this
paper presents the objective of my PhD. So far,
a distributed and clustering based algorithm,
AFDivider, has been proposed. Designed
for Dung’s argumentation framework, it
enumerates the acceptable sets of the main
semantics proposed by Dung. Empirical results
are presented. Possibility of extensions to other
more expressive argumentation frameworks are
planned.
1 Introduction
Among several approaches dealing with
argumentation, Abstract Argumentation Theory
proposes methods to represent and deal with
contentious information, and to draw conclusions
or to take decision from it. It is called “abstract”
because it does not focus on how to construct
arguments but rather on how arguments affect each
other. Arguments are seen as generic entities that
interact positively (support relation) or negatively
(attack relation) with each other.
At first glance, such an approach may seem to be
only theoretical but this abstraction level allows to
propose generic reasoning processes that could be
applied to any precise definition or formalism for
arguments. Argumentation-based reasoning model
has been of application in multi-agent systems
for years now (see [Carrera and Iglesias, 2015] for
an overview). The development of argumentation
techniques and of their computation drives such
applications. This is the very motivation of
my PhD studies: enhancing the use of abstract
argumentation, and more generally argumentation,
by developing better tools, especially algorithms.
A lot of “frameworks” have been designed to
enhance expressivity in abstract argumentation
(e.g. [Nouioua and Risch, 2010, Baroni et al., 2011,
Coste-Marquis et al., 2012, Amgoud et al., 2017]) as
well as “semantics”. While a given framework
specifies the way of representing and expressing
an argumentation problem (types of relations
between arguments, weight on attacks or arguments,
higher-order relation, etc.), a semantics, defined for
a specific argumentation framework (AF), captures
what is a solution of an argumentation problem, in
the sense of what is acceptable.
The study roadmap of my PhD is to first
focus on solving more efficiently argumentation
problems that are expressed in the basic, seminal
argumentation framework and semantics defined by
Dung [Dung, 1995]. Then, the idea is to extend my
work for more enriched argumentation frameworks.
Dung’s semantics produce sets of arguments,
so-called “extensions”. Those arguments, taken
together, are solution of the argumentation problem.
The main contribution of my PhD so far is the
proposal of a new distributed and clustering based
algorithm to compute Dung’s semantics. It has
been designed for certain types of “large-scale”
argumentation frameworks, that produce a lot of
different extensions.
The principles of this algorithm are discussed
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in Section 2. In Section 3 the results of this
application are shown and possible extensions to
other frameworks are presented. Perspective for
future work is then opened.
2 A distributed and clustering
based algorithm
The idea that leads to the so-called AFDivider
algorithm is that one could take advantage of the
shape of the argumentation framework to compute
more efficiently the extensions of a given semantics.
Let consider argumentation frameworks with space
and dense areas. Rather than building extensions
that cover the whole AF, which could be time
consuming, it may be a good idea to cut the AF into
pieces along those identified dense areas, compute
simultaneously parts of extensions and finally wisely
reunify extensions parts together. This is the big
picture of the proposed algorithm. We are going to
see in more details how it works.
The first step of the AFDivider algorithm is
to remove the so-called “trival part” of an AF.
Given that the grounded extension is included in
all complete, and so preferred and stable extensions
and that the grounded extension can be found in
linear time, we first compute it and remove all
the arguments concerned by it from the AF (all
arguments that are in it or attacked by it). The
resulted AF is considered as the “hard part” of the
AF. Notice that it may be non connected. The
AFDivider algorithm takes advantage of it.
The second step is to find clusters in the resulting
AF. There exist several algorithms to cluster graphs.
The AFDivider algorithm uses a spectral clustering
method, usually used in machine learning for cluster
identification. It is particularly well suited for sparse
graph and this fits the type of AF we are interested in.
Without going into details, this clustering is based on
a similarity measure between arguments. In our case
it is the number of relations between neighbouring
arguments. From the overall pairs of similarity, a
matrix computation is done in order to find well
shaped clusters as much as possible.
The third step is to compute parts of extensions
according to a given semantics (complete, preferred
or stable). For each argument in a given cluster which
is attacked by an argument outside this cluster, we
compute the semantics of this cluster by considering
that its attackers could be accepted, rejected or in
an undecidable state in their own clusters. This
computation is made in a simultaneous way.
The last step is to reunify the parts of extensions
together. The cluster parts are reunified with
respect to the constraints on cluster external relation
states. Then parts of connected components are
joined together (this does not require constraint
checking as there are no relation between connected
components). Finally the grounded part is added to
all of them. This is how we obtain extensions of the
whole AF. 1
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Figure 1: Example of an argumentation framework: Γ
Let briefly illustrate the AFDivider algorithm on
the AF shown in Figure 1 for the complete semantics.
Step 1: The grounded extension is {a}: a, b and c
are removed from Γ with the attacks involving them.
We obtain two connected components as show in
Figure 2.
d
ef
gh
i
(a) Component 1: γ1.
j
k l m
n
(b) Component 2: γ2.
Figure 2: Connected components resulting from the
grounded removal pre-processing.
Step 2: Four clusters are determined from γ1 and
γ2: κ1, κ2, κ3 and κ4 as shown in Figure 3.
Step 3: The cluster extensions are computed
simultaneously. We have:
1Note that some subtleties for the computation of the stable
and preferred semantics are not presented for sake of brevity.
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(d) κ4.
Figure 3: Identified clusters.
• For κ1, three extensions: {h}, {i} and {}.
• For κ2, three extensions: {d, f} ,{e, g} and {}.
• For κ3, one extension: {}.
• For κ4, three extensions: {m}, {n} and {}.
Step 4: Finally, the reunifying process checking
compatible parts produces six extensions: {a},
{a, n}, {a, d, f, h}, {a, d, f, h, n}, {a, e, g, i} and
{a, e, g, i, n}.
3 Discussion
A competition, ICCMA, that compares
argumentation solvers on their ability
to solve the enumeration of extensions
problem (and other decision problems) was
created a few years ago.2 Some editions
of this competition have been analyzed:
[Bistarelli et al., 2018, Rodrigues et al., 2018]
highlight that some AF instances have been
particularly hard to solve, and that others
were not solved at all, considering the
preferred semantics notably. Many of these
instances are of Baraba´si–Albert (BA) type
[Albert and Baraba´si, 2002], which is a structure
found in several large-scale natural and human-made
systems, such as the World Wide Web and some
social networks [Baraba´si et al., 2016]. Those types
of AF are among the ones AFDivider has been
designed for.
In order to evaluate the performances of our
algorithm we compare it with some of the best
2International Competition on Computational
Models of Argumentation (ICCMA)
http://argumentationcompetition.org/.
solvers3 at that time for the complete, stable and the
preferred semantics and on some hard AF instances
that have been identified.
For each experiment, we used a 6 core processor,
each core having a frequency of 3 GHz. The RAM
size was 45GB. The timeout had been set to 1 hour.
The results, reported in Table 1, show that
this approach of clustering and reunifying extension
parts is very relevant for some types of AF.4
Indeed, although for the stable semantics pyglaf and
AFDivider have similar solving time, for the preferred
semantics we can observe a real change of order of
magnitude.
These experiments led to publications. See
[Lafages et al., 2018] and [Doutre et al., 2019] for
deeper explanations and analysis5.
Further analysis for other clustering methods and
with new solvers are currently in progress. A
work to propose algorithms for other frameworks is
also in process. The first framework types we are
interested in are the ones with higher-order attacks,
that is, that allow attack on attacks, especially
AFRA (see [Baroni et al., 2011]) and RAF (see
[Cayrol et al., 2017]). Before proposing algorithms,
a work must be done for determining the complexity
of computing semantics in those frameworks. There
is also a need of tools such as labellings6 that
is more convenient for an algorithmic approach
than searching for sets of elements. A preliminary
part of these works can already be seen, as
published technical reports: [Doutre et al., 2020b]
3See respectively [Alviano, 2018] and [Cerutti et al., 2017]
for details on Pyglaf and ArgSemSAT solvers.
4amador-transit 20151216 1706.gml.80.apx and
basin-or-us.gml.20.apx are instances which come from
real data of the traffic domain. In Table 1, i1 to i8
correspond respectively to BA 120 70 1.apx, BA 100 60 2.apx,
BA 120 80 2.apx, BA 180 60 4.apx, basin-or-us.gml.20.apx,
BA 100 80 3.apx, amador-transit 20151216 1706.gml.80.apx
and BA -200 70 4.apx. Note that these instances have a
number of extensions under the preferred and stable semantics
that is particularly large (more than a hundred thousand),
and even larger for the complete semantics.
5Note that in Table 1, FAIL means that the given solver
failed to solve the problem due to the limit of time or to
the limit memory space. For more details see the mentioned
publications.
6Labelling is a three value mapping which associates to each
argument of an AF a status, accepted, rejected or undecidable.
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Instances
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
PR
Nb ext. (≈) 0.28× 106 1.07× 106 1.28× 106 1.37× 106 1.96× 106 4.47× 106 11.75× 106 10.74× 109
AFDivider 0:05.84 0:27.98 0:20.42 0:35.05 0:31.31 1:09.10 12:39.21 FAIL
Pyglaf 0:39.00 6:04.37 10:12.22 14:51.09 54:20.72 FAIL FAIL FAIL
ArgSemSAT FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
ST
Nb ext. (≈) Idem preferred case
AFDivider 0:06.26 0:13.20 0:18.78 0:31.02 0:29.46 0:50.79 1:48.30 FAIL
Pyglaf 0:03.02 0:09.22 0:14.76 0:18.43 0:21.15 0:42.57 1:53.95 FAIL
ArgSemSAT FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
CO
Nb ext. (≈) 0.80× 109 5.22× 109 9.31× 109 11.93× 109 16.18× 109 49.58× 109 - 22× 1015
All three solvers FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Table 1: Experimental results (PR: preferred, CO: complete, ST: stable,“-”: “missing data”). The time
result format is “minutes:seconds.centiseconds”.
and [Doutre et al., 2020a].
4 Conclusion
As a conclusion, my PhD studies focus on
finding algorithms and tools to make the abstract
argumentation domain progress. A very interesting
approach to compute semantics has been proposed
so far and works are in progress to extend this
solving method, or other ones, to more expressive
argumentation frameworks.
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Crafting neural argumentation networks
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Abstract
This paper presents work on constructing
neural network architectures, defined as neu-
ral argumentation networks (NANs), such that
learning is conducted according to argumenta-
tion principles. NANs are designed to learn
attack-relations that are consistent with input
argument acceptability data. Hence this work
describes a process of calculating legitimate
attack-relations that does not rely on examin-
ing the structure of the arguments, which are
not always clear. The paper describes the the-
ory and application of translating argumenta-
tion semantics, as outlined by Dung, to NAN
architectures and compares two distinct forms:
3-valued acceptability, and 2-valued acceptabil-
ity. Future work can be envisioned as extend-
ing the methodology to incorporate more com-
plex argumentation semantics including sup-
port and weighted approaches that could align
with wider data-sets and reasoning problems.
1 Introduction
Neural argumentation networks (NANs) are com-
putational neural networks that learn according
to argumentation principles. Argumentation, as
a field within artificial intelligence, is highly rel-
evant for researchers interested in symbolic rep-
resentations of knowledge and defeasible reason-
ing [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007]. Argumenta-
tion is proffered as a semantics-based logic that
models human reasoning whilst retaining mathe-
matical integrity. Argumentation frameworks (AFs)
[Dung, 1995] offer a graph-based approach that deter-
mines logically consistent argument positions solely
via attack-relations between the arguments. The
shared graphical nature of AFs and computational
neural networks make their union a sensible choice
when looking to bridge the potentially explainability-
intractable numerical methods with high level sym-
bolic interpretation through concepts.
We show that there exists a one-one mapping be-
tween NANs and AFs which is determined by the
attack-relations between arguments. Thus when a
NAN learns, it learns attack-relations according to
input argument acceptability data. Argument ac-
ceptability data comes in the form of a set of la-
bellings, with each argument’s label value indicating
its acceptability within a particular labelling. Each
labelling represents a single consistent position, such
as an individual’s opinion on the acceptability of the
arguments. There is a set of labellings when there is
a data set of many positions, e.g. in a debate between
many individuals. But NANs are not limited to rea-
soning with human opinions on arguments, as any
data for which each data point could be interpreted
as an argument with an acceptability label would be
relevant.
If an AF is already known in full, with fixed attack-
relations, then no learning is required and the NAN
would be used solely for calculating argument accept-
ability from input data. However, attack-relations
will not always be known a priori and so would need
to be learned. The research in this paper focuses
explicitly on the learning aspect of the NAN archi-
tecture. This can be described as the reverse of the
traditional argumentation problem, which deduces
argument acceptability according to input attack-
relations. Learning attack-relations from argument
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acceptability data is especially relevant when the
structure of the arguments does not reliably reveal
the true attacks. An example of this is when an en-
thymeme’s unstated premise is attacked; the struc-
ture is hidden and so the attack is also hidden.
The next three parts of this paper detail the
novel contributions made in achieving the learning
of attack-relations from input argument acceptabil-
ity data:
1. Learning attack-relations from argument accept-
ability data in the form of 3-valued argument la-
bellings.
2. Applying gradualism to the learning process and
accommodating noisy data.
3. Learning attack-relations from argument accept-
ability data in the form of 2-valued argument la-
bellings.
The ordering above indicates the sequence of rea-
soning, in that each subsequent part builds upon
work conducted previously. The third section offers a
discussion of the results and complexity of the various
learning algorithms. A concluding section will then
summarise the current progress and offer suggestions
for future expansions.
2 3-valued attack learning prob-
lem
Reinstatement labellings [Caminada, 2006] form the
basis for the 3-valued labelling approach, in which
arguments will be labelled in, undec or out in any
given labelling. In addition, a special label of null is
used for those arguments that are not labelled in the
particular labelling but are labelled for some other
labelling. In other work awaiting publication, it is
shown that the attack learning problem (in which ac-
ceptability data is provided as input and attacks are
produced as output) is significantly less complex for
3-valued labellings than for 2-valued labelling if the
objective is to find an attack set that is fully consis-
tent with the input data. It is revealed that although
both labelling types are solvable within polynomial-
space complexity, the time complexity is very dif-
ferent. Polynomial-time algorithms exist for the 3-
valued labelling approach whereas the 2-valued la-
belling approach is proven to be NP-complete. More-
over, three labels allow for less ambiguous reasoning
by providing greater distinction between argument
acceptability statuses. The increase in reasoning pre-
cision for 3-valued labels would intuitively produce
more accurate attack-relations that fit the data less
ambiguously than the 2-valued variety. Combination
of the two incentives of reduced complexity and con-
jectured higher accuracy, forms the basis for adopting
the 3-valued attack learning problem as first choice
for NAN implementation.
a b c
d
e
Figure 1: A framework containing a non-empty grounded
extension {a}, two preferred extensions {(a, c), (a, d)},
one stable extension {a, c} an even cycle, and two odd
cycles including one self-attacking argument
Each NAN architecture forms a one-one mapping
with some AF. For example, the framework in Fig. 1
is converted into the NAN depicted in Fig. 2. Only
a simple one-layer neural network is required, but
with essential added constraints on the learning pro-
cess that account for incongruity that would result
from the application of backpropagation alone. Sev-
eral algorithms were developed for the purpose, which
are detailed in other work pending publication. Al-
though the algorithms differ in function, they all op-
erate by forward processing each labelling within the
dataset, producing output argument labels based on
the labels of their attacking arguments according to
complete labelling semantics. The backward learning
process then compares the output argument labels to
the target labels, which are the same as the input la-
bels, and adjusts the weighted edges, and hence the
attacks, according to the error.
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Figure 2: A neural network processing 3-valued labellings,
corresponding to the framework detailed in Figure 1. An
attack (a, b) exists iff an arrow joins node ia to node ob.
3 Gradualism and noisy data al-
gorithms
The previous section detailed the process of learning
attacks from 3-valued argument acceptability data.
However, the learning progressed such that networks
edges, representing attacks, were not incrementally
updated but rather adjusted in a binary manner such
that an attack was true or false according to the
learning error.
By incorporating gradualism into the NAN archi-
tecture, the shape of a given data set has more affect
on the attack-relation learned. Thus, by setting an
expedient learning rate, attacks are adjusted in pro-
portion to the amount of error corrected. This ap-
proach helps to create sparser attack-relations, which
are more appropriate for domains in which it is
assumed that attacks between arguments are rare.
Again, several algorithms have been developed that
employ gradualism to address the 3-valued attack
learning problem.
The final work on the 3-valued approach extends
the incremental learning of the gradualism algorithms
to accord with noisy data. The previous algorithms
all operated by searching for an exact solution equiv-
alent to an AF that would be completely consistent
with the input argument acceptability data set in
keeping with complete labelling semantics. The re-
sulting algorithms are more aligned with general ma-
chine learning in which zero error is not assumed to
be possible. Instead of finding a zero error solution,
the learning is focused on minimising the error.
4 2-valued attack learning prob-
lem
Directly translating complete extension semantics to
a labelling form gives rise to two labels: in and
notin, denoting an argument is within a particular
extension or not respectively. Again the special label
of null is required for arguments without a label for
a given labelling. The 2-valued attack learning prob-
lem addresses the same scenario as for the 3-valued
attack learning problem, but with the 2-valued form
of labelling as input argument acceptability data.
Interestingly, the shift in focus necessitated when
handling noisy data is also employed for the 2-valued
problem. The NP-complete complexity required for
an absolute solution attack-relation is clearly compu-
tationally expensive. Hence, by redefining the prob-
lem to minimising the labelling errors, bounded by a
stopping criteria, it is possible to construct a NAN
architecture and associated algorithms that are more
tractable.
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Figure 3: A neural network processing 2-valued labellings,
corresponding to the framework detailed in Figure 1. An
attack (a, b) exists iff an arrow joins node ia to node hb
(which also dictates that an arrow joins node ha to node
ob).
Fig. 3 depicts the basic structure of the 2-valued
NAN architecture. An additional layer is required in
order to effectively process the ambiguity presented
by the notin label which can correspond to either
undec or out in the 3-valued labelling approach.
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The hidden layer is used to convert the 2-valued input
to the 3-valued approach so that the output is con-
sistent with the fix-point requirements of complete
semantics. The learning is constrained so that for
any given argument a and an argument b the value
of the edge connecting ia to hb is the same as that
connecting ha to ob. This ensures there is no ambi-
guity with respect to which edge should denote the
attack relation, but requires learning updates to ap-
ply to the two edges uniformly.
5 Discussion
As referenced earlier, the complexities of solving the
attack learning problems vary depending on what
type of data labelling is provided as input, the algo-
rithm concerned, and whether a zero-error solution
is required. Table 1 shows that if the objective is
to find an attack set fully consistent with input data
then the time complexity of the 2-valued problem is
significantly worse than for the 3-valued problem. It
is interesting to note that these results also hold for
algorithms implementing gradualism. However, when
noise is introduced, the problem objective switches to
optimization and it is conjectured that a solution for
even the 3-valued problem would be NP-complete.
This is why we require alternative stopping criteria
that allow for a ’good-enough’ solution in lieu of a
prohibitively expensive actual solution.
Problem Time
complexity
Space
complexity
3-valued O(n2|T |) O(n|T | + n2)
2-valued NP-complete O(n|T | + n2)
Table 1: Best-case complexities for the 3-valued and 2-
valued attack learning problems for finding zero-error so-
lution.
Beyond theory, an empirical study of all algo-
rithms was performed with the use of data from
the ICCMA2017 competition, which provided ex-
amples of AFs and associated argument extensions.
The algorithms were trained on the argument la-
bellings pertaining to the extension sets and the out-
put attack-relations were compared to the ’actual’
attack-relations from the original data to measure
the fidelity of the results. In summary, high accu-
racy results were obtainable across all algorithms for
the overall attack-relation (a binary classification in
which all possible attacks were classed in or out), but
attack precision proved to be the greatest challenge.
That said, the performance of 3-valued algorithms
was superior in all metrics compared with 2-valued
alternatives. Algorithms favoring sparse attack-sets
also performed better, especially in attack precision,
which reflects the rarity of attacks in the actual IC-
CMA2017 data.
Both the complexity results and the empirical
study are proposed as novel contributions to the field.
Similar work on realizability [Dunne et al., 2015] and
argumentation synthesis [Niskanen et al., 2019], ad-
dress the attack learning problem but do not succeed
in achieving complexity results for complete seman-
tics. In addition, both related works examine attack
learning through different lens; realizability requires
the solution attack-relation to map one-one to the
input acceptability data, argumentation synthesis is
focused on minimising the number of errors (akin to
the noisy data algorithms referred to in this paper)
but frames the problem as a traditional MAX-SAT
search problem.
Future work can be anticipated in manifold direc-
tions. Expanding the empirical evaluation to real ap-
plications beyond the more abstract data obtained
from ICCMA2017 is vital to assess the potential do-
mains for which NANs can have significant impact in
identifying reliable attack-relations. From a theoret-
ical viewpoint, NAN algorithms could be developed
for more advanced semantics that, for example, incor-
porate weighted approaches and support into their
mechanics, and empirical evaluation could be per-
formed on such algorithms.
6 Conclusion
This paper has described the concept of neural argu-
mentation networks (NANs) that address the attack
learning problem of calculating an attack-relation
based on consistency with input argument accept-
ability data. Three broad novel contributions were
identified with respect to:
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1. Learning attack-relations from argument accept-
ability data in the form of 3-valued argument la-
bellings.
2. Applying gradualism to the learning process and
accommodating noisy data.
3. Learning attack-relations from argument accept-
ability data in the form of 2-valued argument la-
bellings.
The advantages of reduced complexity and superior
attack-relation fidelity derived from using 3-valued
data, as opposed to 2-valued data, were evinced from
both theoretical and empirical results.
The research is relevant in the scope that attack-
relations are essential for the construction of argu-
mentation frameworks. The NAN algorithms are
proffered as a means of calculating such attack-
relations when prior knowledge and extraction from
the argument structure is not reliable. Further re-
search is needed to examine the impact of the algo-
rithms with real domains and to evaluate the effects
of enrich the algorithms with alternative mechanisms
such as support and weighted argumentation.
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Abstract
This paper presents work on automated
story understanding by using commonsense
knowledge acquired from human contributors.
A description of the methodology followed for
acquiring this knowledge is depicted, followed
by a presentation on how argumentation is used
for representing commonsense knowledge. Fur-
thermore this work includes a presentation of
tools that are designed and developed to ac-
quire and apply knowledge for the purpose of
understanding stories.
1 Introduction
One of the major problems in Artificial Intelligence,
that is still an obstacle in the development of “intelli-
gent” machines [McCarthy, 1959], is the lack of com-
monsense knowledge. This work focuses on the prob-
lem of commonsense knowledge acquisition and the
application of this knowledge on the task of story un-
derstanding. Humans are able to understand a text
passage quite easily, starting from young ages, but
machines face a lot of difficulties for the same task.
One of the prerequisites for text understanding is the
existence of commonsense knowledge, i.e., knowledge
that is not explicitly present but it is inferred. Exam-
ples of such knowledge can be easily extracted from
our daily lives, such as “when the sun is up, its day-
time”,“if you just woke up then you should have been
sleeping” and many more.
Why stories? This work focuses on stories, since
they are a very good example of texts with structure,
plot, events that change over time and they hold a
predominant position in the learning path of humans.
From the early childhood, most parents read fairy
tales to their kids both for fun and for learning. The
importance of story understanding is highlighted by
Winston, who stated that “story understanding is the
centrally important foundation for all human think-
ing” [Winston, 2012] .
There were various attempts to gather com-
monsense knowledge either by using experts in
logic (e.g., CyC [Lenat, 2019]) or by using the
crowd (e.g., the Open Mind Commonsense Project
[Singh et al., 2002]). The latter gained a lot of at-
tention with the introduction of the internet, where
access to the crowd was made much easier than be-
fore. Lately, we have seen an increasing interest from
individual researchers and institutions to gather com-
monsense knowledge.
The approach taken in this work, is that common-
sense knowledge appropriate for story understanding
can be gathered by sourcing the task to humans, us-
ing crowdsourcing [Howe, 2006], where both intrinsic
and extrinsic methods for knowledge acquisition are
employed.
Knowledge acquisition is only one part of the prob-
lem that this work needs to address. There is also
the need to find an appropriate representation for
the acquired knowledge. There are attempts to rep-
resent knowledge in a variety of ways, using strict
logic based rules, scripts, and graphs. Singh et al.
(2002) suggested that this knowledge should be rep-
resented in natural language but this adds another
obstacle in the utilization of the acquired knowl-
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Figure 1: A screenshot of the Web-STAR interface depicting background knowledge representation, both
visually (left side) and textually (right side).
edge from machines. This is the part where com-
putational argumentation kicks in. Argumentation is
an appropriate substrate for representing knowledge
since it fits the incomplete and conflicting nature of
commonsense knowledge [Kakas and Michael, 2016,
Michael, 2019]. Moreover, argumentation is also suit-
able to handle preferences between commonsense
knowledge. Argumentation semantics are used both
for knowledge representation and for reasoning in the
internal mechanisms of the tools developed for story
understanding, as part of this work.
2 Method
Research work starts with a literature review on the
current state of affairs on story understanding, com-
monsense knowledge acquisition and appropriate rep-
resentations of the acquired knowledge. This step
provides insights on what was already achieved in
these fields and outlines possible obstacles identified
by other researchers. During this stage, a number of
systems were identified but the focus of the work is
on the ones that use human computation or crowd-
sourcing as a method for acquiring knowledge.
The chosen methodology centers on testing both
implicit and explicit knowledge acquisition methods.
Implicit acquisition methods are described as the ones
that knowledge is contributed without contributors
actively knowing that they are performing this task,
but it is actually a hidden/side task. Explicit acquisi-
tion methods are described as the ones in which con-
tributors know that they are contributing knowledge
and it is their primary task. In this category the mo-
tives are either monetary or research/learning/social
oriented. For the former, motives are mostly fun
since these methods most of the time include the
use of games, i.e., Games With A Purpose (GWAPS)
[von Ahn and Dabbish, 2008].
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Firstly, a tool for facilitating users to encode a
story, and to manually add knowledge rules in a
way that machines can understand them is pre-
sented. This tool is a Web-based Integrated De-
velopment Environment (IDE) called “Web-STAR”
[Rodosthenous and Michael, 2019b]. It facilitates
both expert and non-expert users in encoding stories
in symbolic form and adding background knowledge
(cf. Figure 1), providing also a number of embed-
ded utilities for converting natural language stories to
symbolic format, visually adding knowledge using a
directed graph editor and collaboration functionality.
The internal mechanism of Web-STAR is based
on the STory comprehension through ARgumenta-
tion (STAR) system [Diakidoy et al., 2015]. This is
a prolog based system able to read a text file with
story events at specific timepoints, a list of back-
ground knowledge rules in symbolic format, and a list
of multiple-choice questions. The system outputs the
comprehension model, i.e., which story event holds
at each timepoint and it also provides answers to the
questions posed. The STAR system uses a structured
rule-based argumentation framework similar to that
of ASPIC+ [Modgil and Prakken, 2014]. Combina-
tions of premises from the story with defeasible rules
from the background knowledge form a proof tree in
support of some inference; this tree corresponds to
an argument.
The output is presented both textually and graph-
ically in a timeline format, where users can follow the
comprehension model and track changes to the story
timeline. The IDE was evaluated for its ease of use by
both expert and non-expert users, following user ex-
perience measurement methodologies and it received
a high score in its evaluation.
Secondly, a novel framework and platform
[Rodosthenous and Michael, 2018a], developed for
implementing crowdsourcing applications (e.g.,
Games with a Purpose or language learning appli-
cations) that can be used by human workers for
gathering commonsense knowledge, is presented.
Two experiments were designed and conducted,
that examine whether fully automated or hybrid
crowdsourcing techniques, i.e., techniques that
benefit from both manually, crowd-contributed and
automatic acquisition of knowledge, can be used to
gather commonsense knowledge.
Two Games With A Purpose were de-
veloped using the aforementioned platform.
The first is called “Knowledge Coder1”
[Rodosthenous and Michael, 2014] and relies only on
crowdsourcing approaches to acquire knowledge (cf.
Figure 2). The second is called “Robot Trainer2”
[Rodosthenous and Michael, 2016] and uses a hybrid
methodology for gathering background knowledge
(cf. Figure 3). More specifically, players generalize
knowledge and evaluate its appropriateness in
answering questions on unseen stories. The acquired
knowledge was tested on story comprehension tasks,
such as question answering. The results show that
the gathered knowledge is useful in answering story
questions on new unseen stories, since the gathered
knowledge is applicable in stories other than the
ones used to generate the knowledge.
Both GWAPs follow the approach of breaking this
task into a sequence of more specific tasks, so that
human participants not only identify relevant knowl-
edge, but also convert it into a machine-readable form
and evaluate its appropriateness.
Thirdly, the study sets out to investigate the
problem of inferring the geographic focus of a story
at a country level, i.e., the geographic location
that the story is related to. An application was
developed for inferring the geographic focus of
news stories using crowdsourced knowledge bases,
contributing in understanding the “Where” a story
takes place type of question. This application, called
“GeoMantis” [Rodosthenous and Michael, 2019a,
Rodosthenous and Michael, 2018b] retrieves knowl-
edge from popular crowdsourced knowledge bases,
such as ConceptNet [Speer et al., 2017] and YAGO
[Mahdisoltani et al., 2015] and returns a prediction
of the country of focus.
Current research work is focused on expanding Ge-
oMantis, by applying a crowdsourced strategy for this
task where paid crowd-workers evaluate the useful-
ness of the arguments on identifying the geographic
focus of a document and the evaluated arguments are
tested on whether they improve the accuracy of iden-
1https://cognition.ouc.ac.cy/knowledge_coder
2https://cognition.ouc.ac.cy/robot
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Figure 2: A screenshot of the 3rd mission from
the Knowledge Coder game where players encode
knowledge in logic form using verbs and nouns from
a sentence.
Figure 3: A screenshot of the 1st level from the
Robot Trainer game where players generate rules
by dragging and dropping short phrases in natural
language to form appropriate knowledge rules.
tifying the geographic focus of stories. Results show
encouraging indications that this hybrid methodol-
ogy improves the accuracy.
3 Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of the present research was to investigate
methods for acquiring and using commonsense knowl-
edge for automated story understanding. A combina-
tion of crowdsourcing methods and computational ar-
gumentation allowed both the acquisition of relevant
knowledge and its representation in a way that can be
used for automated story comprehension. Computa-
tional argumentation, provides flexibility in handling
knowledge, drawing inferences in the temporal set-
ting of a story and based on evidences from psychol-
ogy, it is compatible with how us humans comprehend
a story [Diakidoy et al., 2014].
The usage of both implicit and explicit acquisi-
tion methods, and the use of crowdsourcing seems
promising both in terms of quantity and quality of
the acquired knowledge. Explicit acquisition meth-
ods require more time from contributors and exper-
tise in encoding knowledge, whereas implicit ones
can be used by more contributors and for longer pe-
riod, but require more effort in designing the plat-
forms/applications/games to facilitate the acquisi-
tion of knowledge.
In terms of applicability of crowdsourced knowl-
edge for story understanding tasks, the acquired
knowledge is suitable for question answering as it can
be applied both to answer multiple-choice questions
on unseen stories and to identify the geographic focus
of news stories.
The tools presented in Section 2 are developed and
have been tested in a number of scenarios. Moreover,
tools like Web-STAR provide a friendly user interface
for utilizing the capabilities of the underlying story
understanding engine. Interested readers are directed
to the relevant papers to get more information on
each tool and how it is used.
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On the Expressive Power of Argumentation Formalisms
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Abstract
We describe ongoing research on the rel-
ative expressive power of argumentation for-
malisms. Our discussion includes insights and
general results on the connections between
logic programming, abstract argumentation,
assumption-based argumentation and abstract
dialectical frameworks. Due to the scope of the
paper, instead of formally introducing each sys-
tem, we offer an abstract set of logical concepts
(language, interpretations, models, etc.) per-
taining to all argumentation systems. These
concepts are used to describe the methodology
employed in this type of comparative work and
some of the challenges involved. We also discuss
open questions and ideas for future research.
1 Introduction
The raise of research on computational argumenta-
tion is commonly attributed to [Dung, 1995a].
His work comprises an abstract concept of
argument-based reasoning stemming from pre-
vious works on abductive logic programming
[Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989, Dung, 1995b]. Intu-
itively, an argument is a sentence in any given logics,
therefore sets of arguments are expected to satisfy
some criteria of consistency. In the abstract argu-
mentation frameworks of Dung, this criteria is called
admissibility and sets of arguments satisfying it are
called extensions. This terminology was employed
in several extensions of abstract argumentation
frameworks such as assumption-based argumenta-
tion [Bondarenko et al., 1997, Dung et al., 2009]
and abstract dialectical frameworks
[Brewka and Woltran, 2010], but is also found in
the literature of abductive reasoning ([Dung, 1995b],
for instance). Just alike, virtually the same con-
cepts are found with different terminology in
the literature of logic programming semantics
[Lloyd, 1987, Przymusinski, 1990] and other non-
monotonic reasoning formalisms. The similarities
amongst those systems are largely recognized in
the literature: each time a new system is proposed,
it shows that some of the older systems and their
semantics are particular cases of the new. But just
how different these approaches actually are?
That is the main question leading our research.
Our research aims to further the understanding of
semantic and syntactic relations between argumen-
tation formalisms. By doing so, we help creating a
road map for the adaptation of available tools (such
as interpreters, methods, proven results, etc.) be-
tween them. For instance, these connections are of-
ten verified in a single direction to argue the new
systems do at least as much as their predecessors.
But more often than not, by the time a new sys-
tem is proposed, the older systems have several tools
readily available. Could they perhaps be adapted?
Despite this potential, it is rarely verified whether a
new proposal is subsumed by the previous. On that
matter, we seek back-and-forth translations and cor-
respondence results (as we have done, for instance,
in [Caminada et al., 2015b, Caminada et al., 2015a,
Sa´ and Alcaˆntara, 2019, Alcaˆntara et al., 2019]) to
try and answer whether two systems are equivalent
or one subsumes the other. If one of the two direc-
tions of comparison is already in the literature, we
offer results in the complementary direction. Finding
more about these relations is of utmost importance
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to avoid redundant efforts in the development of the
different argumentation systems and their tools.
In this brief paper, we discuss the most common
methodology employed to compare the expressive
power of two logics and (broadly) some results al-
ready obtained. Here, we opt for a rather abstract
presentation of argumentation formalisms using com-
mon logics terminology. This is meant to avoid the
more specific definitions from each system discussed,
since there is a large variety of them. Instead, we
speak of languages, sentences, theories, and their
evaluation as models. Albeit a different nomenclature
than usually adopted in argumentation literature, the
concepts we will discuss permeate all argumentation
formalisms. For this reason, our presentation suffices
to explain the relevant methods and results in enough
detail and can be considered a contribution of this
paper. We also discuss the limitations of currently
known translations between theories in the different
formalisms and some lines of future research.
2 Method
The general scope of works comparing the expressive
power of different logics revolves around translations
between theories in those logics and their respective
models. To detail our method, we will require some
basic logic terminology that permeates all argumen-
tation formalisms. These concepts will later be used
to explain what is sought in translations between the
theories in different systems.
2.1 Language and Models
All argumentation formalisms stemming from Dung’s
work and several non monotonic logics preceding
them are based on 3-valued interpretations over some
particular set of sentences. Here, we will refer to
this set of sentences simply as the language of the
system (denoted L) and consider the truth-values in
V = {t, f ,u}, whose elements stand respectively for
true, false and undecided. Then, an interpretation of
L can be understood simply as a complete function
I : L → V that evaluates elements of L as true, false
or undecided. Each argumentation system has some
basic criteria for the consistency of interpretations,
the most common being Dung’s admissibility criteria
[Dung, 1995a]. Following the standard nomenclature
of logics, here the interpretations of interest for each
system will be simply called models.
A theory is then a series of syntactic specifications
about how sentences interfere in the evaluation of
one another. As an example, a theory T may say
that the sentence A ∈ L can only be true if the
sentence B ∈ L is not. Commonly, a theory will
have many models (because this is only a basic con-
sistency check), but some of those models will have
nicer properties than others. Several interesting pat-
terns concerning those nicer properties can be ob-
served in all argumentation systems we studied. The
most important pattern is likely the existence of a
reference semantics we will here call the complete se-
mantics. Based on the complete semantics, a wide
range of other semantics can be defined simply by
maximizing or minimizing the sets of sentences ac-
cording to one of the truth values. Therefore, we
can generally speak of maximally true complete mod-
els, minimally true complete models, and so on (see
[Caminada et al., 2015b], for instance), in each ar-
gumentation system. Those semantics may receive
different names in different nonmonotonic reasoning
formalisms, so we will refrain from using their more
specific names and simply speak of min/max t/f/u
(complete) semantics in each case.
2.2 Translations and Equivalence
Given two argumentation systems S1, S2, to find
which one is the most expressive, one should investi-
gate how the theories from one system would be mod-
eled in the other. Let Theories(S1), Theories(S2)
be respectively the sets of all theories that can be
proposed in S1, S2, a translation from S1 to S2 is a to-
tal function S1toS2 : Theories(S1) → Theories(S2).
To ensure an adequate translation, several steps of
planning take place. First of all, for each seman-
tics σ of S1, a corresponding semantics corr(σ) of
S2 must be identified. A necessary condition at this
point is that if the semantics τ of S1 can be obtained
from σ by a particular operation f(σ) = τ , then it
must be the case that f(corr(σ)) = corr(τ). There-
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fore, one should seek a translation where given T ∈
Theories(S1), there is a corr(σ)-model of S1toS2(T )
for each model of T in σ. This means that a suitable
translation rewrites T , originally written in the syn-
tax of S1, into the syntax of S2, but in a particular
way that the original semantics of T is preserved. If
this much is achieve by S1toS2, we will have that S2
subsumes S1 on σ. If the same can be proved for all
semantics of S1, we will (respectively) have that S2 is
at least as expressive as S1. Further, if S1toS2 is also
a bijective function preserving the semantics σ for all
S1-theories, we will have that S1, S2 are equivalent
under σ. The two systems are logically equivalent if
a bijective translation is available that preserves all
semantics from both systems in one another.
3 Discussion
The methodology here described has been success-
fully employed in several works to contrast the
semantics of abstract argumentation and logic pro-
gramming [Wu et al., 2009, Caminada et al., 2015b],
abstract argumentation and assumption-based
argumentation [Caminada et al., 2015a], logic pro-
gramming and assumption-based argumentation
[Caminada and Schulz, 2017], different types of
semantics for assumption-based argumentation
[Schulz and Toni, 2017, Sa´ and Alcaˆntara, 2019],
different perspectives in the semantics of abstract
dialectical frameworks [Alcaˆntara and Sa´, 2018],
and the semantics of logic programming to abstract
dialectical frameworks [Alcaˆntara et al., 2019],
amongst other works. As part of this PhD, we made
significant contributions in [Caminada et al., 2015b,
Caminada et al., 2015a, Alcaˆntara and Sa´, 2018,
Sa´ and Alcaˆntara, 2019, Alcaˆntara et al., 2019].
The relative expressive power of argumentation
systems is commonly investigated based on their re-
spective complete semantics first. This choice is moti-
vated by some desirable properties of the complete se-
mantics, but also because it generalizes several other
semantics in most systems. Commonly, these works
found back-and-forth correspondences in all partic-
ular cases of the complete semantics, except for the
minimally undecided complete semantics.
For instance, when comparing abstract argu-
mentation and logic programming [Wu et al., 2009,
Caminada et al., 2015b] the translation from an ab-
stract argumentation framework F into a logic pro-
gram AAtLP(F) is very straightforward: there will be
an atom in the language of AAtLP(F) for each ar-
gument in F and the rules in the program describe
the attack relation from F . This translation ensures
there is precisely one sentence in the language of the
goal theory (a logic program) for each sentence in the
input theory (an argumentation framework). This
property makes it drastically simple to prove that
logic programming subsumes abstract argumentation
in the complete and in all other semantics derived
from it. Going the other way around is a bit harder:
for each possible derivation (a proof) that is possi-
ble in a logic program P, an argument is instanti-
ated in LPtAA(P), then an attack relation is estab-
lished based on which derivations are supported by
each model of the program. In this other transla-
tion, there may be multiple arguments in LPtAA(P)
for each atom in P, so a bijection between the two
languages cannot be ensured. This makes it harder to
prove the correspondence in each semantics and also
causes an exception involving the semantics that min-
imize undecided sentences in each system. That is,
the complete semantics that minimizes undecided ar-
guments in LPtAA(P) fails to capture the correspond-
ing semantics from logic programming for P. These
results propose that logic programming is more ex-
pressive than abstract argumentation.
Similar results suggest that assumption-based
argumentation is more expressive than ab-
stract argumentation [Caminada et al., 2015a]
and logic programming [Bondarenko et al., 1997,
Caminada and Schulz, 2017], and that logic pro-
gramming is more expressive than abstract dialectical
frameworks [Alcaˆntara et al., 2019], amongst others.
In each case, there is an exception concerning
the respective semantics that minimize undecided
sentences in the corresponding complete semantics
in one of the two directions. Those results are still
tied to the translations employed, so there might
be alternatives ensuring a correspondence between
those systems in all semantics. Fortunately (or
not), the accumulated evidence suggests that it is
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not the case. Instead, there would be some slight
differences that can only be detected by semantics
minimizing undecided sentences in each system.
This is very curious, as it suggests that we deal
with slightly different flavors of undecidability in
those systems. In the bigger picture, the results
ensure those systems are equivalent in all other
cases of the complete semantics, including the more
mainstream semantics: stable and grounded (or
well-founded). That is, logic programming, abstract
argumentation, assumption-based argumentation
and abstract dialectical framework may entirely
replace one another in several situations and the
tools available for each system are compatible with
all other systems.
The final steps planned for this thesis regard new
perspective in the comparison of logic programming
and assumption based argumentation using the se-
mantics proposed in [Sa´ and Alcaˆntara, 2019]. We
will also add results on new translations between
abstract argumentation and logic programming de-
signed to close the existing gap concerning their re-
spective semantics that minimize undecidedness.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed about the relative ex-
pressive power of argumentation systems and other
nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. We introduced
the important concepts for this line of research us-
ing a general terminology that is standard in log-
ics (truth-values, language, interpretations, models,
theories) and the methodology commonly employed
in these works. This methodology was employed in
several works to find numerous correspondences be-
tween semantics of argumentation systems. Unfor-
tunately, discussing all related results and works is
beyond the scope and length of this paper, so we
restricted our attention to some of the more recent
works, including our own. As we gather the litera-
ture on the subject, we find several argumentation
systems are nearly equivalent, with only a marginal
exception regarding the minimization of undecided
sentences. The evidence supports that these systems
can replace one another (concerning expressive power
and semantics) and that all tools available to each one
may be easily ported to the others.
Several ramifications of our work allow future lines
of research (beyond the scope of this PhD), the most
trivial being the investigation of other argumentation
systems in connection to those we studied. In par-
ticular, establishing an equivalence under the com-
plete semantics of another system to either one we
mentioned suffices to ensure its equivalence to all the
others. A less trivial and potentially more interesting
issue regards the general concept of model, which is
far more relaxed than the complete models and varies
widely in those different systems. Each formalism has
a different criteria of basic consistency, but despite
similarities, they usually do not correspond. We con-
jecture that these concepts actually correspond for
all systems we mentioned and investigating this mat-
ter will likely result in strong intuitions about the
different types of undecidability that apparent exist
within nonmonotonic reasoning. Alike, it is desirable
to further understand the differences between those
semantics minimizing undecidedness. If one can es-
tablish operations, new translations or even specific
criteria to close the gaps on the missing semantics
between those formalisms, we may be able to tell at
once if they are different and, if that is the case, why.
Finally, there is a question of computational complex-
ity. If we were to assume all these argumentation
systems are semantically equivalent, the differences
would be entirely syntactic. Then we should expect
that the syntax of some systems favors more efficient
computation of models. At the same time that we
can focus on translations between systems to com-
pute their semantics, a better approach would be for
the community to improve their systems and compete
for computational efficiency in the computation of
answers (their models) or simply drop those systems
that are proven inefficient to focus on the more promi-
nent ones. This matter should be of high value to the
argumentation community for the sake of human re-
sources: if we are developing the same tools under
only different syntax, many efforts will be redundant
and therefore wasteful; but if we join forces in the de-
velopment of tools for fewer prominent systems, we
encourage cooperation and will likely achieve better
results in the long run.
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Abstract
Machines of the future might either be
endowed with or might develop mechanisms
to argue with other agents. We consider
the contexts in which these types of machines
also develop reasons to act dishonestly by
attempting to deceive their interlocutors.
Using the argumentation dialogue games
approach, this work aims to explore how
deceptive machines might be engineered in
order to mitigate or neutralise their malicious
behaviour. Argumentation dialogue games can
be a powerful approach for the modelling of
deception given that it offers an explainable
way of representing the components necessary
for deception such as the knowledge of the
agents, their ability to perform actions (to
communicate arguments), their ability to
reason defeasibly about the world, and most
importantly, their ability to reason defeasibly
about each others’ minds. This paper presents
three different hybrid agent-based models
derived from argumentation that (i) have been
successfully used and that (ii) can be used in
future work to model machine deception.
1 Introduction
The ability of machines to deceive autonomously
is increasingly drawing the interest of the AI
community, as well as the interest of the philosophical
and digital humanities communities. This has also
been enhanced by the emergence of the post-truth
technological era driven by the popularisation of the
term fake news [Lazer et al., 2018].
Currently, most of the approaches in AI merely
focus on using machine learning capabilities to either
(i) generate fake information [Yao et al., 2017], or (ii)
detect fake news from big data [Conroy et al., 2015],
or (iii) by enhancing machine learning using
techniques such as argument mining to detect
deception [Cocarascu and Toni, 2016]. However,
as pointed out in [Sarkadi, 2018] and in
[Sarkadi, 2020b], these data-oriented approaches
fail to account for several critical components of
deception, namely the intention of the agents to
deceive, their Theory of Mind of their targets, and
the reasoning behind their deceptive acts. Apart
from these explainability issues (see [Miller, 2018])
which machine learning approaches face, there is also
the issue of representational and design accuracy.
Deception and deception detection require social
intelligence. That is the ability of agents to reason
about other minds in order to influence other agents
through communication [Castelfranchi, 1998]. In
this context, communication represents social actions
which influence belief changes, and by extension
behavioural changes, in other social agents. Is
the AI used behind fake news and deepfakes truly
autonomous? Obviously it is not, since it is unable
to act autonomously, as well as unable to reason
about what information should be fed to whom
in order to deceive. These so called types of
“deceptive” AI merely act as tools in the hands
of truly socially intelligent agents, namely the
humans that have the intent and the communicative
capabilities to act dishonestly. How do we then
model socially-intelligent autonomous deceptive
agents that truly behave dishonestly?
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In this paper we present a novel
argumentation-based dialogue game method to
model and study autonomous deceptive agents. This
method is extensively described in [Sarkadi, 2020a]
and aims to address the problem of modelling
deceptive machines from the socially-intelligent
agent-based perspective.
2 Method
To model deception, we mainly focus on interactions
between two agents, the Deceiver, and its target,
which we have called the Interrogator. The aim of
the Deceiver is, obviously, to deceive the Interrogator,
whereas the aim of the Interrogator is to find out
the desired truth. We have adopted the following
definition of deception:
Deception The intention of a deceptive agent,
to make or cause another target agent to believe
something is true that the deceiver believes is false,
with the aim of achieving an ulterior goal or desire.
The method we have used to address deception
as defined above is the application of opponent
modelling to dialogue argumentation games. We have
used belief-desire-intention BDI-like architectures to
model the cognitive properties of the agents that play
these dialogue games [McBurney and Parsons, 2009].
Giving BDI agents a communication protocol
along with a reasoning mechanism enables them
to think pragmatically about their beliefs, their
desires, and their intentions in order to perform
speech acts [Rao et al., 1995]. In argumentation,
these speech acts can represent arguments, as
well as argument chains and argument systems.
Apart form performing speech acts, our agents
are able to reason about their opponent’s mind.
In other words, they have a Theory of Mind
(ToM) that enables mind-reading. ToM is
the ability of an agent to reason about the
mental attitudes (beliefs, desires, and intentions)
of another agent [Goldman, 2012]. According to
[Isaac and Bridewell, 2017], mind-reading is a crucial
ability for a machine to have in order to be able to
deceive or detect deception.
3 Discussion
In this section we present three models that we
have built using the method presented in the
previous section. All of these models represent
deception according to our adopted definition where
the Deceiver aims to achieve an ulterior goal. Once
this ulterior goal is achieved, deception becomes
successful.
The ulterior goal of the Deceiver can even be
as simple as desiring that the target believes
something is true, when the Deceiver believes it
is false. If there is another ulterior goal, that
in order to be met requires deception, then the
causation of a false belief becomes the subgoal.
This is the case in [Panisson et al., 2018], where we
have implemented in an agent-oriented programming
language a car-dealing agent that deceives in order to
cause its target to buy a car the dealer agent desires
to sell. The implemented agent can also decide to lie
or bullshit. However, we mention the fact that lying
or bullshitting is different from deception as they do
not require a ToM to cause a false belief.
Another form of ulterior goal is in the case
of interrogation games, where the Deceiver
needs to cause the Interrogator into accepting
the story that emerges from their dialogue. In
[Sarkadi et al., 2019a], we have presented an
argumentation dialogue game model for generating
credible stories. In this model, both Deceiver and
Interrogator use the same Toulmin-like reasoning
technique to generate simple or complex arguments
(that represent stories or narratives) using the
ToM of their opponent. The ToM of the opponent
contains simple arguments, as well as argument
attacks and argument backings, that the opponent
knows.
Estimating the success of deception given the
communication of an argument can be problematic.
The dynamics of deceptive attempts can be
influenced by the uncertainty of certain social
factors such as: the trust of the interlocutor, the
degree of confidence in one’s own ToM of the
interlocutor, and one’s degree of communicative
skill. In [Sarkadi et al., 2019b] we have continued
our work from [Panisson et al., 2018]. We have
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used BDI architectures to model, evaluate and
implement in an Agent-oriented Programming
Language deceptive interactions under factors
of social uncertainty. This model aims to
integrate components of two major theories
of deception, namely Interpersonal Deception
Theory [Buller and Burgoon, 1996] and Information
Manipulation Theory 2 [McCornack et al., 2014].
By modelling information manipulation as well as
uncertainty of the social factors, we have enabled
the Interrogator to consider its own degree of trust
in the Deceiver in order to reason about what is
being communicated. Given the levels of trust of
the Interrogator, we have also enabled the Deceiver
to estimate its success at deception by taking into
account the trust of its target, the uncertainty of its
ToM of the target, as well as its communicative skill.
A critical result from the evaluation of the model
shows that agents with strong skeptical attitudes
are prone to unintended deception.
Properties
The three models that we have developed in
[Panisson et al., 2018], [Sarkadi et al., 2019a], and
[Sarkadi et al., 2019b] present different desirable
properties that are useful for the study of machine
deception (See Table 1). Below we describe each of
these properties:
1. Explainability should be a crucial property of
argumentation-based models of deception. We
should be able to evaluate deceptive mind games
and say whether deception takes places and
if it does we need to explain why and under
which conditions it does. An explainable model
should be able to inform us if deception can be
prevented or mitigated in different contexts.
2. Unintended Deception happens when the
Deceiver does not attempt deception, but the
consequences of its communicative acts result
in its potential target to be deceived. It is
important for models of deception to be able to
represent such unintended consequences as they
are critical for accountability. We need to be
able to tell if an agent that has the ability to
deceive should be held responsible for its actions
or not.
3. Uncertainty in communication should be
considered when modelling deception. This is
especially important for modelling an agent that
estimates its likelihood of success, as well as
modelling agents with different degrees of trust
in each other. While most of the times trust
should be a default attitude towards others
[Levine, 2014], in cases of potential deception
this is not the case.
4. Storytelling is the ability of an agent to
communicate arguments in such a way as to
describe to another agent a meaningful chain
of events. The ability to build narratives is an
emerging topic in AI. Deceptive agents can use
this ability to their own benefit, e.g. deliver a
fictitious story that compels a jury into absolving
them of a crime. Therefore, it should be
desirable for models of deception to consider or
represent such mechanisms.
5. Deception Detection is desirable to be
represented in a model. While some models
represent and explain why deception is
successful, they do not represent how and
why deception might be detected. It is also
important to distinguish between an agent that
has the ability to detect deception and one
that has the tendency to believe or not what a
Deceiver is communicating, which is the case in
some models. Representing deception detection
could be also useful in showing how a Deceiver
might act knowing that its target is able to
detect its deceptive intents, as well as how its
target might detect them.
6. Implementation is to be desired, but
not necessary for modelling deception, or
any other social phenomenon. However,
demonstrating an implementation of the model
helps others to use it for studying different
multi-agent system setups and scenarios of
social interactions. Implementation also
improves the transparency of a model,
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increasing the model’s accessibility through its
code.
Model Properties 1 2 3 4 5 6
[Panisson et al., 2018] X - - - - X
[Sarkadi et al., 2019a] X - - X X -
[Sarkadi et al., 2019b] X X X - - X
Table 1: Comparison of our models in terms of their
respective desirable properties for the study of machine
deception.
Future Work
Modelling deception using dialogue games
for argumentation offers explanatory and
representational power, especially if we want to
show properties such as the ones expressed by the
models we introduced and described here. However,
none of the models presented expresses the full
spectrum of these properties. By no means should
this discourage the continuation of our method for
the study of deception. This paper has classified a
posteriori the models according to the properties
they have managed to express. The models have not
been designed and built starting from an a priori
knowledge of this classification. Having defined
this classification should help us continue using our
method towards building more expressive models of
machine deception.
A problem that future work should aim to
overcome is the introduction of an environment in the
socio-dynamical representations of deception using
dialogue games. Our models have mainly focused on
the direct interaction between the Deceiver and its
target, but unfortunately they have failed to take into
account how a Deceiver might use the environment
for manipulating the beliefs of its target. We believe
this could be a viable research path worth pursuing
in the modelling of machine deception.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an
argumentation-based dialogue game method for
modelling deception in AI that is extensively
described in [Sarkadi, 2020a]. We have introduced
two critical components for representing deception,
namely BDI agent architectures and Theory of
Mind. Our method relies on these components
for representing social interactions between two
agents, the Deceiver and the Interrogator. We have
described and compared three models that we have
built using the presented method. We have also
compared the models according to their results and
to several desirable properties introduced in the
paper, namely explainability, unintended deception,
uncertainty, storytelling, deception detection, and
implementation.
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Abstract
With the abundance of data available in to-
day’s world, e.g. from the web, social media
platforms and crowdsourcing systems, it is com-
mon to find conflicting information from differ-
ent data sources. Truth discovery algorithms
aim to find the true ‘facts’ amongst such con-
flicts by estimating the trustworthiness of data
sources, so that the claims made by trustwor-
thy sources can be given priority. Since source
trustworthiness is unknown a priori, such al-
gorithms jointly estimate trust in sources and
belief in facts, assigning higher trust scores to
sources who claim believable facts and higher
belief scores to facts claimed by trusted sources.
Truth discovery has received increasing atten-
tion in the data mining and crowdsourcing lit-
erature, but other perspectives may offer addi-
tional insight into the problem and potential so-
lutions. In this paper we discuss the link be-
tween truth discovery and argumentation, with
a particular focus on bipolar abstract argumen-
tation.
1 Introduction
Information is available in ever-increasing quantities
in today’s world. The web, social media platforms
and crowdsourcing systems host vast amounts of data
from a diverse range of sources, including individual
users, websites and smartphone sensors. Sources nat-
urally vary in their reliability and the quality of data
they produce, which can cause conflicts when multi-
ple sources comment on the same issue. This poses a
problem for automatically extracting information on
factual matters: which sources should we trust, and
which ‘facts’ should we believe?
Truth discovery algorithms aim to solve this is-
sue by estimating the trustworthiness of data sources
[Li et al., 2016]. Facts claimed by trustworthy sources
are given high weight in producing the aggregated out-
put, whereas those claimed by untrustworthy sources
have little impact. Truth discovery has been stud-
ied in the data mining and crowdsourcing literature,
where unsupervised algorithms jointly estimate the
trustworthiness of sources and a measure of belief in
the facts being proposed. However, other perspectives
may offer additional insight into the problem and its
potential solutions. In this paper we take preliminary
steps to explore argumentation-based approaches to
truth discovery.
Argumentation deals with finding sets of ‘accept-
able’ arguments given the attacks (i.e. conflicts) be-
tween them. This shares a high-level similarity with
truth discovery, where we aim to produce coherent
outputs by resolving conflicts between claims from
multiple sources. One may therefore wonder whether
truth discovery can be rephrased as an argumenta-
tion problem. If so, argumentation semantics would
translate to new algorithms for truth discovery. Such
algorithms would make explicit the indirect conflicts
and attacks present in truth discovery, and potentially
lead to explainable algorithms (e.g. via discussion
games).
Many systems of argumentation have been stud-
ied in the literature and could be applied to
truth discovery. In the present paper we nar-
row our focus to bipolar abstract argumentation
[Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] – where there
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are both attack and support relations between argu-
ments – and give a simple method for converting a
truth discovery problem into one of bipolar argumen-
tation.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we
formally define the truth discovery problem. Section 3
briefly reviews different approaches to abstract argu-
mentation from the literature. Section 4 shows how
truth discovery may be formulated in terms of bipolar
argumentation, and we conclude in section 5.
2 Truth Discovery Problem
Formulation
To provide context for the rest of the discussion, we
formally state the truth discovery problem in this sec-
tion. This formulation is a minor variation of our pre-
vious work [Singleton and Booth, 2020].
We consider fixed disjoint sets S,O and F which
represent sources, objects and facts respectively. A
source represents an entity which provides data, e.g.
a website, an individual or piece of sensor equipment.
An object represents a real-world entity or question,
e.g. ‘What is the height of Mount Everest?’. A fact
represents a piece of information, relating to an ob-
ject, which a source may claim is true, e.g. ‘Mount
Everest is 8,850m tall’. An object may have several
conflicting facts relating to it; one of the aims of truth
discovery is to determine which fact should be be-
lieved.
The input to truth discovery, which we term a truth
discovery network, consists of a set of claims between
sources and facts, and the links between facts and ob-
jects. We add the constraints that each fact is related
to a single object, and sources cannot claim conflicting
facts.
Definition 1. A truth discovery network (hereafter
a TD network) is a pair N = 〈C,L〉 where
1. C ⊆ S × F and C 6= ∅
2. L ⊆ F ×O and L 6= ∅
3. For each f ∈ F there is a unique o ∈ O such that
(f, o) ∈ L. We denote such o by objN (f)
Figure 1: Example graph representation of a truth
discovery network, with sources s, t, u, v, objects o, p
and facts f, g, h, i. Here s and t disagree on the true
fact for objects o and p. Sources u and v do not
comment on object o, but agree with t on object p.
4. For each s ∈ S and f, g ∈ F , if (s, f), (s, g) ∈ C
then objN (f) 6= objN (g)
Let N denote the set of all TD networks.
Example 1. Consider the TD network N = 〈C,L〉
where C = {(s, f), (t, g), (s, h), (t, i), (u, i), (v, i)} and
L = {(f, o), (g, o), (h, p), (i, p)}. This network can
be visualised as a directed graph whose nodes are
S ∪ F ∪ O, and whose edges are C ∪ L, as shown in
fig. 1.
The output of truth discovery is an assessment of
the trustworthiness of sources and the believability
of facts. We also allow multiple outputs, in analogy
with how argumentation semantics may yield multiple
extensions.
Definition 2. A truth discovery operator (hereafter
a TD operator) is a mapping T : N → RS∪F . We
write TN for T (N) so that TN : S ∪ F → R is a
mapping which assigns each source a trust score and
each fact a belief score. A multi-valued operator is
a mapping T : N → P(RS∪F ), where P denotes the
power set operation. That is, TN is a set of mappings
S ∪ F → R.
Note that a (single valued) operator induces total
preorders on S and F for each network N – these
represent the trust and belief rankings in sources and
facts respectively. That is, TN (s1) ≤ TN (s2) means
source s2 is considered at least as trustworthy as s1,
and TN (f1) ≤ TN (f2) means that fact f2 is at least
as believable as f1.
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3 Argumentation Frameworks
Many kinds of abstract argumentation frameworks
(AFs) have been studied in the literature. At a mini-
mum, an AF consists of a set of arguments and some
interactions between them. Arguably the most well-
known is Dung’s abstract argumentation framework,
which is a pair AF = 〈A,R〉 with A being a set
of arguments and R ⊆ A × A the attack relation
[Dung, 1995].
Here arguments interact only through attacks.
Whilst a notion of defense exists by combin-
ing two chained attacks, it has been argued
that this is not sufficient for all examples, and
an independent notion of support is required
[Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005]. This leads to
the definition of a bipolar argumentation framework.
Definition 3 ([Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005]).
An abstract bipolar argumentation framework (BAF)
is a tuple 〈A,Ratt,Rsup〉 where A is a set of argu-
ments, Ratt ⊆ A × A is the attack relation, and
Rsup ⊆ A×A is the support relation.
The addition of a support relation is appealing from
the truth discovery point of view, since an important
component of a TD network is the support between
sources and the facts they claim are true.
Other work in the literature extends Dung’s model
in other ways to encode additional information. Many
such extensions are appropriate for handling multi-
agent argumentation and reasoning about trust and
reliability in arguments. For example, social ab-
stract argumentation [Leite and Martins, 2011] mod-
els users who vote for/against arguments before
semantics are applied. Weighted argumentation
[Baroni et al., 2019] equips arguments with an initial
weight, which can be used to represent the reliability
of the source putting the argument forward. Similarly,
weights may be applied to the attack or support inter-
actions [Janssen et al., 2008]. Trust between multiple
agents has also been studied, where each agent con-
structs an AF based on the beliefs of others and the
trust placed in them [Parsons et al., 2011].
We leave the study of these areas in relation to truth
discovery for future work, and focus solely on bipolar
argumentation in the present paper.
4 Argumentation-based Truth
Discovery
In this section we describe a method for translating
a TD network into a BAF, and illustrate how bipo-
lar semantics may be applied to truth discovery with
an example. It must be stressed that this is not the
only possible method for reframing truth discovery in
terms of argumentation; nor is it the only method even
for bipolar argumentation. Nonetheless, we consider
this to be a necessary first step towards exploration
of argumentation-based methods.
4.1 Constructing a Bipolar Frame-
work
Given a TD network as per definition 1, we must con-
struct a BAF. This involves defining the arguments
and the attack and support relations.
Defining the Arguments. Recall that the outputs
of (abstract) argumentation tell us which sets of argu-
ments are acceptable given the interactions between
arguments. Now, in truth discovery we are interested
in not just which facts to believe, but also which
sources to trust. Moreover these two halves of the
problem must cohere with one another: a fact claimed
by trusted sources should be believed, and a source
claiming believable facts should be trusted.
To maintain this symmetry, we propose to en-
code both source trustworthiness and fact believabil-
ity through the arguments. That is, for each source s
we introduce an argument “s is a trustworthy source”,
and for each fact f we introduce an argument “f is a
believable fact”. Identifying such arguments with the
sources and facts themselves, we take the set of argu-
ments to be A = S ∪ F . Note that this is contrary
to other approaches to multi-source argumentation,
which consider the sources to exist at a level above
the arguments (e.g. [Parsons et al., 2011]). Note also
that the objects O are not explicitly represented as ar-
guments, and instead play a role in the construction
of attacks below.
Defining the Attack and Support Relations.
The inherent conflicts in a TD network lie between
mutually exclusive facts that relate to the same ob-
ject. We therefore introduce an attack between (the
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arguments corresponding to) facts f and g when-
ever objN (f) = objN (g) and f 6= g. Note that this
may be expressed by a ‘mutual exclusion’ relation
M = (L ◦ L−1) \ iF , which is symmetric.1
When it comes to the support relation, an intuitive
definition is that sources support the believability of
the facts they claim, and facts support the trustwor-
thiness of the sources claiming them.2 That is, the
support relation is Rsup = C ∪C−1. In full, our trans-
lation from TD networks to BAFs is as follows.
Definition 4. The BAF associated with a network
N = 〈C,L〉 is B(N) = 〈A,Ratt,Rsup〉 where A =
S∪F , Ratt =M = (L◦L−1)\iF and Rsup = C∪C−1.
Note that while attacks only exist between
facts, indirect conflicts in the TD network
can be expressed through complex attacks
[Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2013]; e.g. sources
have a supported attack on facts conflicting with their
beliefs and a super-mediated attack on sources with
whom they disagree.
4.2 Argumentation Semantics
Equipped with a mapping B from TD networks
to BAFs, we can form a TD operator by apply-
ing semantics to B(N). Identifying which seman-
tics yield intuitive results for truth discovery is an
interesting task for future research. Here we aim
only to illustrate the idea with a simple example;
for this we take the meta-argumentation approach
of [Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2013]. This method
uses the attack and support relations to form new
‘meta-arguments’ consisting of sets of arguments from
the BAF. Applying Dung’s complete semantics to the
resulting meta AF yields a multi-valued TD operator
Tmeta.3
Let N be the TD network from example 1. Defer-
ring the technical details of the meta-argumentation
system to the original paper, B(N) yields two meta-
arguments X1, X2, where X1 = {s, f, h}, X2 =
1Here ◦ denotes composition of relations, L−1 denotes the
symmetric inverse of L, and iF denotes the identity relation on
F .
2This is the intuition underlying many existing TD operators
in the literature.
3Specifically, we define TmetaN (x) = 1 if the meta-argument
corresponding to x is accepted under complete semantics in the
meta AF, and TmetaN (x) = 0 otherwise (x ∈ S ∪ F).
{t, u, v, g, i}, and each argument attacks the other.
The complete extensions are therefore {X1}, {X2}
and ∅. Hence TmetaN = {φ1, φ2, φ3} where for i ∈ {1, 2}
we have φi(x) = 1 if x ∈ Xi and φi(x) = 0 otherwise
(x ∈ S ∪ F), and φ3 is constant 0.
φ1 and φ2 represent two opposite points of view
that may be taken in the TD network: one may ei-
ther trust s and its associated facts, rejecting the con-
flicting facts and disagreeing sources, or apply the
same reasoning with source t. The final possibility
φ3, which corresponds to the grounded extension, de-
clines to trust or believe anything.
For practical applications of argumentation-based
truth discovery, extension-based operators such as
Tmeta may be inappropriate due to their absolutist
nature: a source (resp. fact) is either trustworthy
(resp. believable) or not, with no middle ground. To
take a more fine-grained point of view one may instead
apply gradual semantics [Baroni et al., 2019], where a
numerical acceptability degree is assigned to each ar-
gument. We leave this to future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has taken preliminary steps towards truth
discovery methods based on bipolar argumentation.
However many unanswered questions remain, such as
how our TD network to BAF translation compares to
other possibilities and which bipolar semantics should
be applied. Any new argumentation-based TD opera-
tors should also be evaluated – this can be done exper-
imentally or by consideration of which desirable theo-
retical properties operators have, i.e. axioms for truth
discovery [Singleton and Booth, 2020]. Such axioms
could be compared against similar axioms in gradual
argumentation [Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2016] to see
whether properties of semantics translate into prop-
erties for truth discovery. More broadly, other ar-
gumentation systems besides bipolar should also be
investigated to establish their applicability to truth
discovery and justify our approach.
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Abstract
We discuss ranking arguments from an
Dung-style argumentation framework with the
help of conditional logics. Using an intuitive
translation for an argumentation framework to
generate conditionals, we can apply nonmono-
tonic inference systems to generate a ranking
on these conditionals. With this ranking we
construct a ranking for our arguments.
1 Introduction
Abstract argumentation has become a popular
topic in artifical intelligence, mainly in the area of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. Espe-
cially in this area, ranking the solutions does receive
increasing attention over the last few years. The
usual approach to reason using abstract argumen-
tation frameworks is to differentiate between “ac-
cepted” and “rejected” arguments. But using a rank-
ing over the arguments yield to a more fine-grained
approach.
There are already ideas for ranking arguments,
named ranking-based semantics [Amgoud and Ben-
Naim, 2013], like a ranking with respect to a cat-
egoriser function [Pu et al., 2014] or based on a
two-person zero-sum strategic game [Matt and Toni,
2008] and many more. [Delobelle, 2017] summarizes
the state-of-the-art models for ranking arguments.
We want to use a novel approach by using condi-
tional logics for our ranking model. Conditional logic
is a general non-monotonic representation formalism
that focuses on default rule of the form “if A then
B” and there exist some interesting relationships be-
tween this formalism and that of formal argumen-
tation [Kern-Isberner and Thimm, 2018, Heyninck
et al., 2020].
Figure 1: Argumentation framework from Example 1
a b c d
The rest of this work is organized as follows: In
Section 2 all necessary preliminaries will be stated.
Then we discus our ranking idea in Section 3 and
with Section 4 we conclude this paper.
2 Background
In the following, we want to briefly recall some gen-
eral preliminaries on conditional logic and argumen-
tation frameworks.
2.1 Abstract Argumentation Frame-
works
In this work we use the idea of argumentation frame-
works first introduced in [Dung, 1995]. An argumen-
tation framework AF is a pair 〈A,R〉, where A is a
finite set of arguments and R is a set of attacks be-
tween arguments with R ⊆ A×A. An argument a is
said to attack b if (a, b) ∈ R. We call an argument a
acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ A if for each at-
tacker b ∈ A of this argument a with (b, a) ∈ R, there
is an argument c ∈ S which attacks b, i.e., (c, b) ∈ R;
we then say that a is defended by c. An argumen-
tation framework 〈A,R〉 can be illustrated by a di-
rected graph with vertex set A and edge set R.
Example 1. Let AF = 〈A,R〉 with A = {a, b, c, d}
and R = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, d), (d, c)} be an argumenta-
tion framework. The corresponding graph is shown
in Figure 1. Argument b is not acceptable with re-
spect to any set S of arguments, as b is not defended
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against a’s attack. On the other hand, c is acceptable
with respect to S = {a, c}, as a defends c against b’s
attack and c defends itself against d’s attack.
Up to this point the arguments can only have the
two statuses of accepted or not accepted1, but we
want to have a more fine-graded comparison between
arguments. For this we use the idea of rankings-based
semantics [Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2013, Delobelle,
2017].
Definition 2 (Ranking-based semantics). A
ranking-based semantics σ associates to any argu-
mentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉 a ranking σAF
on A where σAF is a preorder on A. a σAF b means
that a is at least as acceptable as b. With a 'σAF b
we describe that a and b are equally acceptable.
Finally we say a is strictly more acceptable than b,
when a σAF b.
We denote by σ(AF ) the ranking on A returned
by σ.
2.2 Conditional Logics
A possible world w for a propositional language is a
function, which evaluates an atom a in this language
with true or false. We say w satisfies an atom a
if w(a) = true, written w ` a. We denote the set
of all interpretations as Ω(A). We will abbreviate an
interpretation w with its complete conjuction, i.e., if
a1, . . . , an ∈ A are the atoms that are assigned true
by w and an+1, . . . , am ∈ A are the ones assigned
with ⊥, w will be identify a1 . . . anan+1 . . . am.
As a conditional we interpret a pair (ϕ|φ) with the
information meaning ”if φ is true then ϕ is true
as well”. For conditional logics we use the approach
from [De Finetti, 2017], who considers conditionals
as generalized indicator functions for possible worlds
resp. propositional interpretations w:
((ϕ|φ))(w) =

1 : w ` φ ∧ ϕ (verifies)
0 : w ` φ ∧ ¬ϕ (falsifies)
u : w ` ¬φ (not applicable)
(1)
where u stand for unknown. Informal speaking a
world w verifies a conditional (ϕ|φ) iff it satisfies
1Using labeling-based semantics we can generate a three-
valued model [Wu et al., 2010].
both antecedent and conclusion ((ϕ|φ)(w) = 1); it
falsifies iff it satisfies the antecedence but not the
conclusion ((ϕ|φ)(w) = 0); otherwise the conditional
is not applicable ((ϕ|φ)(w) = u). A conditional (ϕ|φ)
is satisfied by w if it does not falsify it.
Semantics are given to sets of conditionals via rank-
ing functions [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996, Spohn,
1988]. With a ranking function, also called ordinal
conditional function (OCF), κ : Ω(A) → N ∪ {∞}
we can express the degree of plausibility of possi-
ble worlds κ(φ) := min{κ(w)|w ` φ}. With the
help of OCFs κ we can express the acceptance of
conditionals and nonmonotonic inferences, so (ϕ|φ)
is accepted by κ iff κ(φ ∧ ϕ) < κ(φ ∧ ϕ). With
Bel(κ) = {φ|∀w ∈ κ−1(0) : w ` φ} we denote the
most plausible worlds.
As there are an infinite number of ranking func-
tions that accept a given set of conditionals, we con-
sider System Z [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996] as an
inference relation, which yields us a uniquely defined
ranking function for reasoning.
Definition 3 (System Z). (ϕ|φ) is tolerated by a fi-
nite set of conditionals ∆ if there is a possible world
w with (φ|ϕ)(w) = 1 and (φ′|ϕ′)(w) 6= 0 for all
(φ′|ϕ′) ∈ ∆. The Z-partition (∆0, . . . ,∆n) of ∆ is
defined as:
• ∆0 = {δ ∈ ∆|∆ tolerates δ}
• ∆1, . . . ,∆n is the Z-partition of ∆ \∆0
For δ ∈ ∆: Z∆(δ) = i iff δ ∈ ∆i and ∆1, . . . ,∆n is
the Z-partitioning of ∆.
We define a ranking function κZ∆ : Ω → N ∪ {∞}
as κZ∆(w) = max{Z(δ)|δ(w) = 0, δ ∈ ∆} + 1, with
max ∅ = −1. Finally ∆ |∼Z φ if and only if φ ∈
Bel(κZ∆).
Example 4. Let ∆ = {(a|¬b), (b|¬a), (c|¬b ∧ ¬a ∧
¬d), (d|>), (c|¬d)}. For this set of conditionals, ∆ =
∆0 ∪∆1 with ∆0 = {(a|¬b), (b|¬a), (c|¬b∧¬a∧¬d)}
and ∆1 = {(¬a ∧ ¬b| d)} therefore we have the val-
ues from Table 1. So we can derive (κZ∆0)
−1(0) =
{abcd, abc¯d, ab¯cd, ab¯c¯d, a¯bcd, a¯bc¯d} and (κZ∆1)−1(0) =∅.
3 Discussion
In this work we want to extend the work of [Heyn-
inck et al., 2020] and [Kern-Isberner and Thimm,
2018] to not only combine abstract argumentation
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Table 1: Values for Example 4
ω Z((a|¬b)) Z((b|¬a)) Z((c|¬b ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬d)) Z((d|>)) Z((¬a ∧ ¬b|d))
abcd u u u 1 0
abcd u u u 0 u
abcd u u u 1 0
abcd u u u 0 u
abcd 1 u u 1 0
abcd 1 u u 0 u
abcd 1 u u 1 0
abcd 1 u u 0 u
abcd u 1 u 1 0
abcd u 1 u 0 u
abcd u 1 u 1 0
abcd u 1 u 0 u
abcd 0 0 u 1 1
abcd 0 0 1 0 u
abcd 0 0 u 1 1
abcd 0 0 0 0 u
and conditional logics, but also present ideas to rank
arguments using this combination.
The general idea is to represent an abstract ar-
gumentation framework as a set of conditionals, us-
ing System Z in order to determine a ranking func-
tion that accepts these conditionals, and then extract
rankings on arguments from this ranking function.
First we need a translation from an argumentation
framework to conditional logics. It is clear, that for
an argument to be acceptable every attacker has to
be not acceptable. With this idea we can construct
the conditional logic knowledge base. Let AF be an
argumentation framework and θ : A → CA, where
CA is the set of conditional knowledge bases over the
propositional language generated by A.
θ(AF ) = {(a|B)|(a ∈ A), B = ¬b1 ∧ ¬b2 ∧ . . .
∧ ¬bn, where (bi, a) ∈ R} (2)
In other words, θ models that an argument is ac-
cepted if all its attackers are not accepted.
We can use inference systems like system Z [Gold-
szmidt and Pearl, 1996] on these conditional knowl-
edge bases to generate a ranking over these worlds.
Based on this ranking we want to rank the arguments.
A first idea is to count the number of occurrences of
a positive literal in the set of worlds (κZ∆)
−1(0) and
then rank the corresponding arguments based on this
number. So if an argument a has a higher count then
an argument b, we say a  b. This simple idea yields
a clear and uniquely defined ranking, while not need-
ing an complex algorithm to be computed.
Definition 5. Let AF = 〈A,R〉 be an argumenta-
tion framework translated with help of θ(AF ) and a
inference system to the set of worlds κZ∆. Define
CcsθκZ∆(ω)
(a) = |{w ∈ (κZ∆)−1(0)|w ` a}| (3)
We can then use this counting function for our
ranking-based semantics.
Definition 6 (Conditional-counting-based seman-
tics). The Conditional-counting-based semantics
(Ccbs) associates to any argumentation framework
AF = 〈A,R〉 a ranking CcbsAF on A such that ∀a, b ∈
A with respect to a transition θ and a ranking func-
tion κZ∆(ω).
a CcbsAF b if and only if CcsθκZ∆(ω)(a) ≥ Ccs
θ
κZ∆(ω)
(b)
Example 7. Let AF = 〈A,R〉 with A =
{a, b, c, d} and R = {(a, b), (b, a), (a, c), (b, c), (d, c)}
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Figure 2: Argumentation framework from Example 7
a b
c
d
be an argumentation framework. The correspond-
ing graph can be found in Figure 2. Using Equa-
tion 2 we obtain ∆ = {(a|¬b), (b|¬a), (c|¬b ∧ ¬a ∧
¬d), (d|>)}. With ∆ = ∆0 we have (κZ∆)−1(0) =
{abcd, abc¯d, ab¯cd, ab¯c¯d, a¯bcd, a¯bc¯d}. Now we can
count the number of occurrences of each argument.
So Ccsθ
κZ∆(ω)
(a) = 4, Ccsθ
κZ∆(ω)
(b) = 4, Ccsθ
κZ∆(ω)
(c) =
3 and Ccsθ
κZ∆(ω)
(d) = 6. This results in d Ccbs
a 'Ccbs b Ccbs c. Looking at the graph we see,
that argument d is unattacked, so it is intuitive that
this argument is ranked at the highest position. Also
the arguments a and b are attacking each other and
are not attacked by any other argument. These two
arguments are there indistinguishable and should be
ranked on the same level, but both arguments have at
least one attacker so it should be ranking lower then
d. Argument c is attacked by three other arguments
and defended by none, hence this argument should
be ranked lower then its attackers.
For some ideas of other translations we recommend
[Heyninck et al., 2020]. Instead of system Z we could
also use c-representations [Kern-Isberner, 2001].
Ranking-based semantics are usually evaluated
wrt. a series of rationality postulates [Amgoud and
Ben-Naim, 2013, Delobelle, 2017]. We want to
look at two simple ones and evaluate our seman-
tics with them. Namely Void Precedence [Matt and
Toni, 2008, Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2013] and Self-
Contradiction [Matt and Toni, 2008]. The idea of
Void Precedence states that a non-attacked argument
should be strictly more acceptable than an attacked
argument.
Definition 8 (Void Precedence). A ranking-based
semantics σ satisfies Void Precedence if and only if
for any AF = 〈A,R〉 and ∀a, b ∈ A , if ∀c ∈ A
(c, a) /∈ R and ∃d ∈ A with (d, b) ∈ R , then
a σAF b.
On the contrary, a self-attacking argument should
always be ranked worse than any other argument, be-
cause these arguments are contradicting themselves.
This is handled with the property Self-Contradiction.
Definition 9 (Self-Contradiction). A ranking-based
semantics σ satisfies Self-Contradiction if and only if
for any AF = 〈A,R〉 and ∀a, bA, if (a, a) /∈ R and
(b, b) ∈ R then a σAF b.
Proposition 10. Ccbs does not satisfy Void Prece-
dence nor Self-Contradiction.
Hence this semantics has a few shortcomings,
but an extension, which solves the problem of
self-attacking arguments, should yield a reasonable
ranking-based semantics. A full analysis for such a
semantics will be presented in a follow-up work.
Another future work approach is to look at other
frameworks like ADFs presented in [Brewka et al.,
2013], which uses an acceptance function for every
argument. This could prove to be helpful in finding
a ranking with conditional logic.
[Kern-Isberner and Simari, 2011] used a similar
idea to rank arguments from a Defeasible Logic Pro-
gramming (DeLP), a system, which combines logics
programming with defeasible argumentation. They
used system Z to identify “good” arguments.
4 Conclusion
In this work we have presented a first idea to rank
arguments with conditional logics. For this we first
looked at a simple transition from an argumentation
framework to conditional logic and applied an infer-
ence relation. Using a simple counting idea results in
a ranking over arguments.
Although this semantics does not satisfy two de-
sired properties, we have a established simple con-
nection between ranking arguments and conditional
logic. In the future we can improve this idea and
present a ranking-based semantics, which satisfies a
good number of properties presented in [Delobelle,
2017].
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Speech acts and enthymemes in argumentation-based dialogues
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Abstract
In logic-based argumentation arguments
typically consist of a conclusion deductively
and/or defeasibly inferred from some premises.
However, in practice, humans do not al-
ways present all the elements of their argu-
ments. Alternatively, they assert arguments
with an incomplete logical structure called en-
thymemes. In this paper, we present locutions,
witnessed in real-world dialogues, that handle
the use of enthymemes during argumentation-
based dialogues. Some of these locutions have
not been studied in computational models of
argumentation-based dialogues and, thus, they
enrich existing systems which capture limited
scenarios on how a dialogue can unfold. Addi-
tionally, we highlight our PhD objectives.
1 Introduction
When computational agents (computer programs
that perform actions autonomously) engage with hu-
mans, for example to resolve conflicts, find a proof
or cooperate to reach a decision, they need to justify
their claims if they want to convince the other party
that these claims are valid. This is a key concern of
argumentation. By exchanging arguments the agents
try to draw conclusions regarding the topic of their
discussion. This process is known as argumentation-
based dialogue. From now on we will be referring to
argumentation-based dialogues as dialogues.
In most works which concentrate on dialogues,
arguments are dealt in an abstract way, i.e. argu-
ments are depicted as atomic formulas (abstract
argumentation). However, we use logic-based argu-
mentation since it examines the internal structure of
an argument, i.e. the components used to instantiate
it, thus allowing to explore enthymemes, which are
more representative of real life dialogues. If we are
to provide normative support for human-human
debate and enable AIs and humans to jointly reason,
we need to investigate how to process enthymemes
during dialogues.
Although there are some works on enthymemes,
e.g. [Black and Hunter, 2012, Hosseini et al., 2014,
Hunter, 2007, Panisson and Bordini, 2017], most of
them focus on how to formalise enthymemes when
agents share some knowledge and why an agent might
decode an enthymeme in a wrong way. Only a few
works explore dialogue systems which employ en-
thymemes, but they only adopt specific types of dia-
logues, namely inquiry [Black and Hunter, 2008] and
information-seeking [Hosseini et al., 2017] dialogues.
Consequently, they express limited cases regarding
how a dialogue may develop and the different answers
that can be given by a participant.
The objective of our research is to develop a dia-
logue system which allows the use of enthymemes for
various dialogue types [Walton and C. W., 1995] and
to generate an argumentation framework (referred to
as dialogue framework throughout the rest of the pa-
per) from the moves made, which is used to evaluate
the acceptance of enthymemes according to some se-
mantics. Moreover, we want to investigate if there
is a correspondence between the dialogue framework
created at any stage in the dialogue and the Dung
argumentation framework [Dung, 1995] instantiated
by the contents of all the moves made at that stage
in the dialogue.
In this paper, we present a set of speech acts,
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which supports our desired dialogue system,
through the use of an example. These locutions
are effectively motivated by the everyday use of
enthymemes. While some of them have already
been used in existing dialogue frameworks, e.g.
[Amgoud et al., 2000, Black and Hunter, 2007,
Prakken, 2005, Hosseini et al., 2017], there are
others that have not been applied in current compu-
tational models of dialogues.
2 Method
We formalise arguments within the ASPIC+ frame-
work [Modgil and Prakken, 2013] as, using it, we
can apply Dung’s theory for evaluating argu-
ments [Dung, 1995], it accounts for the struc-
ture of arguments and it can accommodate exist-
ing argumentation formalisms, such as deductive
argumentation [Bondarenko et al., 1997] and ABA
[Besnard and Hunter, 2008]. At the same time it,
also, provides guidelines for one to define their own
way of constructing arguments into a given logic.
This allows us to use, also, the concept of argument-
trees [Hosseini et al., 2014] which is necessary to de-
fine enthymemes structurally and is compatible with
the rest of the principles of ASPIC+.
To instantiate locutions motivated from real life
scenarios, we decided to create an example based on
a real world law case named Frazier v. Cupp (1969).
As a case of a persuasion dialogue, analyzing it gave
us useful insights since we are only aware of how
enthymemes are handled in inquiry and information
seeking dialogues. Afterwards, we formalised a
basic dialogue system which provided us with the
foundations on how to model an interaction between
two agents.
3 Discussion
In this section, we show how locutions found work.
Solid arrows depict strict inference rules, meaning
that if its antecedents are accepted, its consequent
must be accepted. Double line arrows represent
defeasible inference rules, meaning that if its an-
tecedents are accepted, its consequent must be ac-
cepted unless there are good reasons not to.
Example 1. The police arrests Frazier with his
cousin and tries to prove to Frazier that he is guilty
for the death of a person, whereas Frazier tries to per-
suade the police that he is innocent. The policeman
asserts the argument A:
“You were in the bar where the victim was last
seen alive.”(premise a) “If you were in the bar where
the victim was last seen alive, then you are a sus-
pect.”(inference rule a → b) “Therefore you are a
suspect.”(conclusion b).
Then Frazier asserts the enthymeme B1:
“I was not in the bar where the victim was last seen
alive.”(¬a)
based on the argument B:
“I was at my cousin’s block of flats the whole
time.”(c) “My cousin can confirm I was at my
cousin’s block of flats the whole time.”(e) “If I was
at my cousin’s block of flats the whole time and my
cousin can confirm I was at my cousin’s block of flats
the whole time, then I was not in the bar where the
victim was last seen alive.”(c, e → ¬a) “Therefore,
I was not in the bar where the victim was last seen
alive.”(¬a)
A dialogue must start by an assert move in or-
der for the agent to set the topic of the dialogue.
Later, using assert, an agent moves an argument or
an enthymeme to attack a previous argument or an
enthymeme in the dialogue. As we can see in Exam-
ple 1, B1 is moved against the premise of A since B1
is the negation of the premise of A. However, Fra-
zier does not give a support for his claim and so the
policeman, who is not aware of the argument B, can
ask Frazier to justify it. To capture this we introduce
the locution why which requests from the other par-
ticipant to provide support for their assertion. Addi-
tionally, we propose the locution because as an an-
swer to the locution why. This speech act allows the
participant to either backward expand on their previ-
ous enthymeme, i.e. move an argument/enthymeme
which consists of the support for their last claim and
their claim, or repeat their assertion if there is no
support for it. Frazier, now, can use because to move
B and fulfil the request of the policeman or he can
use the locution stop to show that he wants to end
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the dialogue. An agent can use stop as a reply to
every speech act that will follow, unless specified.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, suppose that
Frazier answers to the why locution by using
because(B). The policeman, then, asserts the en-
thymeme C1:
“Your cousin confessed.”(f)
based on the argument C:
“Your cousin confessed.”(f) “Your cousin told the
police she was asleep.”(t) “If your cousin confessed
and your cousin told the police she was asleep, then
apparently she cannot confirm that you were in your
cousin’s block of flats the whole time.”(f, t ⇒ ¬e)
“Therefore, apparently, your cousin cannot confirm
that you were in your cousin’s block of flats the whole
time.”(¬e)
As we can see in Example 2, it is not clear to Fra-
zier why the policeman moved C1 against B as it does
not attack any one of its components and Frazier is
not aware of C. In this case Frazier could, naturally,
ask the policeman what is implied by the enthymeme
that he used, so that Frazier understands the attack-
ing relationship between the two claims. To capture
this we introduce the locution and-so. This question
indicates that the sender of the previous move must
forward expand on what they asserted, i.e. reveal
what they mean by their enthymeme. To fulfil Fra-
zier’s request, the policeman must use the locution
hence which is used when a participant of a dialogue
needs to elaborate on the enthymeme they moved by
declaring their syllogism and the conclusion to which
it leads. The agent can also repeat their claim, using
hence, in case there is nothing more they meant by
what they revealed. Specifically, in Example 2, the
policeman would have to reveal C.
Example 3. Continuing Example 2, suppose that in-
stead of asking and − so, Frazier (based on C1 and
his own knowledge) assumes that the policeman’s in-
tended argument is D:
“Your cousin confessed.”(f) “Your cousin told the
police you left her flat for a few minutes.”(u) “If
your cousin confessed and your cousin told the po-
lice you left her flat for a few minutes, then ap-
parently you were not at your cousin’s block of flats
the whole time.”(f, u ⇒ ¬c) “Therefore, apparently,
your were not at your cousin’s block of flats the whole
time.”(¬c)
and so he replies with the argument E:
‘I was having a phone call at the corridor of
my cousin’s block of flats.”(z) “The corridor of my
cousin’s block of flats is part of my cousin’s block of
flats.”(v) “If I was having a phone call at the cor-
ridor of my cousin’s block of flats and the corridor
of my cousin’s block of flats is part of my cousin’s
block of flats, then I was at my cousin’s block of flats
the whole time.”(z, v → c) “Therefore I was at my
cousin’s block of flats the whole time.”(c)
Let us assume that the policeman is not aware of
D. Then he cannot understand why Frazier moved
E as a reply to C1. As before, the policeman can use
the locution and−so to ask Frazier what he means by
his claim. However, Frazier does not mean anything
more than what he revealed, i.e. there are no other
conclusions to be drawn based on what he moved.
So he answers with the locution hence by moving
again E. Since Frazier repeated his argument, mean-
ing that there is nothing more to add, the policeman
can explore if Frazier understood something else than
what the policeman meant by his enthymeme. To
capture this, we introduce the locution what-did-
you-understand. An agent uses this speech act to
ask their counterpart what they assumed when they
received the agent’s argument/enthymeme.
To answer to the what − did − you − understand
question, an agent uses the locution assumed. With
this locution the agent reveals the argument that
he believed his counterpart meant by the last argu-
ment/enthymeme he moved. Continuing Example 3,
if the policeman used the locution what−did−you−
understand, Frazier would need to use either stop, to
show that he wants to end the dialogue, or assumed,
to reveal D and, in this way, explain what he under-
stood based on C1 and why he moved E.
Suppose that the speech act assumed is used by
Frazier. Now the policeman has two options: either
to correct Frazier and reveal the argument that the
policeman really intended or to confirm that what
Frazier revealed, using assumed, is actually the in-
tended argument of the policeman. To capture this
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we introduce the locutions meant and agree, re-
spectively. In our example, if the policeman chose
to use the locution meant he would have to reveal C,
whereas if he chose the locution agree he would have
to move D again. Since we have assumed that the
policeman was not aware of D, the policeman would
have to choose meant(C).
We have gathered all the speech acts explained
above, together with the permitted replies for
each one, in Table 1. If we compare our proposed
locutions with those from other works in dialogues
which capture enthymemes, we can see that we
have added some new ones (and − so, hence,
what − did − you − understand, assumed, meant).
With these new speech acts, firstly, we are able to
deal with enthymemes which we can forward expand,
i.e. based on the enthymeme moved we can ask for
and reveal the conclusion intended by it. Secondly,
we can address situations of misunderstandings
where the recipient of an enthymeme constructs a
different argument than the one intended by the
sender.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced locutions inspired from
real world dialogues between human agents. Using
these locutions we are able to define a dialogue
system which handles enthymemes and subsumes
a variety of dialogue types. Due to lack of space
we were unable to explain other aspects of the
developed dialogue system, i.e. its protocol and
the dialogue framework generated based on the
moves exchanged. Using our speech acts we are
able to manage situations in dialogues where we
need to backward expand enthymemes (like other
works do), forward expand them and clarify any
misunderstandings between the participants due
to enthymemes. In the best of our knowledge, the
last two cases are not integrated by relevant works.
We conjecture that if participants play ‘logically
perfectly’ (see [Prakken, 2005]), then the status of
enthymemes in the dialogue framework at any stage
in a dialogue will correspond with the status of these
enthymemes in the Dung argumentation framework
instantiated by the contents of all the moves made
at that stage in the dialogue. The next step of
our research is to explore this assumption. If time
permits, we will also investigate how enthymemes
can be used for strategic purposes in persuasion
dialogues.
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Locutions Replies
assert assert
why
and− so
stop
why because
stop
because assert
why
and− so
stop
and− so hence
stop
hence assert
why
and− so
what− did− you− understand
stop
what− did− you−
understand
assumed
stop
assumed meant
agree
meant assert
why
and− so
stop
agree assert
stop
stop assert
stop
Table 1: Locutions and their replies in a dialogue
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